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INTRODUCTION
In its eagerly awaited June 2006 decision in In re Walt Disney
1
Company Derivative Litigation (Disney V), the Delaware Supreme
2
Court, the court at the “center of the corporate universe,” held that
the good faith required of corporate directors encompasses “not
simply the duties of care and loyalty, . . . but all actions required by a
true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and
3
4
its shareholders.” The Disney standard —what we call the “new” good
faith—differs from traditional notions of the concept—the “old”
good faith—in that it serves as the “doctrinal vehicle” for addressing
conduct that “does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but
5
is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.”
As courts and commentators have recognized, the fiduciary
obligation to act in good faith has long been a part of Delaware’s
6
corporate law, although it seldom has been a significant focal point
in actions seeking to hold corporate directors accountable. The
“new” good faith has emerged in the decade since the Chancery
Court’s 1996 decision in In re Caremark International Derivative

1. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). For a summary of the principal decisions in the
Disney litigation see infra note 14.
2. See E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7
Del. L. Rev. 163, 166-67 (2005) [hereinafter Corporate Universe] (recounting
Delaware’s progression toward this central position). For discussion of the
importance of the role of Delaware courts in the development of corporate
jurisprudence, see generally William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware
Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus.
Law. 351 (1992).
3. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
4. As used in this Article, the “Disney standard” refers to the duty of good faith
articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in its June 2006 decision. See id.
5. Id. In its November 2006 decision in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme
Court made clear that the “fundamental . . . fiduciary duty violated by [a failure to
act in good faith] is the duty of loyalty.” No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 at *6 (Del. Nov. 6,
2006). Pursuant to the Delaware Supreme Court’s customary practice, the court has
not yet released the opinion cited in this Article “for publication in the permanent
law reports[, and] until releases, it is subject to revision or withdrawal.” Id. at *1.
Stone was argued on October 5, 2006, and the court handed down its decision on
November 6, 2006, id., after the original finalization of this Article, just as it was
going to press. With the able assistance of the editors of the American University
Law Review, the authors have endeavored to incorporate this very recent decision
into the Article, although time pressures prohibited extensive exploration all of its
ramifications.
6. See, e.g., id. at 67 & cases cited id. at n. 11; Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of
Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Good Faith in
Corporate Law]; Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L.J. 1 (2005); E. Norman Veasey
& Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1399 (2005) [hereinafter What Happened in Delaware].
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7

Litigation. As articulated in Disney V, the obligation imposes an
affirmative duty to act when failure to do so constitutes conscious
8
In other words, it
disregard of known directorial obligations.
requires directors to make a good faith effort to do their jobs.
It is no accident that the new good faith has emerged and garnered
significant attention at a time when the economic security of so many
9
Americans depends on the financial health of major corporations.
The Delaware courts’ recent articulations of the duty of good faith
respond to a deep need to find ways to restore trust in corporate
directors. This is particularly true with respect to the directors of
major corporations who wield tremendous power over the lives of
10
investors, employees, and entire communities.
Delaware, like all states, charges directors with the task of
managing “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized
11
under” its laws.
Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s General
Corporation Law permits corporations to exculpate directors from
personal liability for breach of the duty of care in performing that
task, but not for violations of the duty of loyalty or acts not in good
12
faith. In its June 2006 decision in Disney V, the Delaware Supreme
7. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
8. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 62-67. This critical distinction is discussed in Parts II
and III infra.
9. In 1998, approximately fifty-two percent of Americans owned stock in one
form or another—through individual investment, mutual funds, pension plans,
etc.—in comparison with one percent in 1900 and thirteen percent in 1980. See
THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL. 252-53 (2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/
14business6.htm; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006 455 (125th ed. 2005), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/ income.pdf (follow “Table Number 655”
link) (detailing the composition of individuals’ savings).
10. Cf. Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV.
361, 364 (2005) (“Enron and its progeny . . . cause[d] an unimaginable ripple effect
on the market, as tens of billions of dollars of market capital was destroyed, workers’
retirement plans were devastated, shareholders’ dreams were ruined, and individual
investors’ trust in the stock market was shattered.” (citing ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS xi (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds.,
2004))). See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS
CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 9-21 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (discussing impact of
Enron and other recent corporate debacles on public confidence); CG Hintmann,
Comment, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the Context of Directorial Fiduciary Duties
and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 571, 571 n.3 (2005)
(citing CITIZEN WORKS, THE CORPORATE SCANDAL SHEET (2003), http://www.citizen
works.org/corp/corp-scandal.php) (noting large number of companies investigated
for dishonesty and fraud in the 200-2005 period).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006). For the relevant statutory text, see
infra text accompanying note 153.
12. Id. § 102(b)(7). This controversial provision was added in 1986 in the wake
of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). See supra text accompanying
notes 134-149.
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Court confirmed that even exculpatory provisions do not permit
13
unbridled directorial disregard of management responsibilities.
The court agreed with Chancellor Chandler, who tried the case, that
good faith serves to “ensure that the persons entrusted by
shareholders to govern Delaware corporations do so with an honesty
of purpose and with an understanding of whose interests they are
14
there to protect.”
Despite these lofty words, Disney V upheld the Chancery Court’s
ruling in favor of the defendant directors, and the tone of the court’s
15
subsequent decision in Stone v. Ritter suggests that it is anxious to
avoid a flood of litigation alleging general breaches of the duty to act
16
in good faith. Nevertheless, both decisions make clear that good
17
faith is a distinct fiduciary obligation, although Stone defines this
obligation as a component of the “fundamental” fiduciary duty of
loyalty, rather than as a freestanding duty, at least in Caremark-type

13. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 65.
14. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 760 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005). See Disney V, 906 A.2d at
66-67. The shareholder derivative litigation involving The Walt Disney Company has
produced six opinions, four of which are discussed in this Article. This series of
decisions began with In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342,
380 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ initial complaint for failing to plead
facts sufficient to support their claim and excuse pre-suit demand), followed by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000) (upholding the Chancellor’s grant of a
motion to dismiss, but giving the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint). The
third decision was In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 825 A.2d 275,
291 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
amended complaint and allowing claim for breach “of the foundational directorial
obligation to act honestly and in good faith” to proceed); the fourth was In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), No. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (granting defendant Michael Ovitz’s motion for partial summary
judgment); the fifth was In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d
at 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) (post-trial opinion, finding no waste or breach of fiduciary
duties by the defendant directors). Disney V, 906 A.2d at 27 (upholding Chancellor’s
decision in favor of the defendant directors) is the last of these decisions. This
Article discusses Brehm, Disney II, Disney IV, and Disney V.
15. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
16. Stone involved a shareholders’ derivative action seeking to hold directors
liable for failing to put in place monitoring systems adequate to enable them to learn
of illegal employee conduct that ultimately required the corporation to pay criminal
and civil fines and penalties of $50 million. Id. at *1. See infra text accompanying
notes Part II.B.3.d.
17. Stone, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6. In dicta, the court sought to clarify related
doctrinal issues. It termed the language of Disney V and earlier cases referring to
good faith “as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and
loyalty,” as a way of describing good faith “colloquially.” Id. at *6. The Stone opinion
also characterized the duty of good faith as an “indirect” basis for imposing
directorial liability, noting that the Disney V court reserved the “issue, whether a
violation of the duty to act in good faith is a basis for the direct imposition of liability,
was expressly left open in Disney [V].” Id. at n.29. See infra text accompanying note
30 and Part II.B.3.d.
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oversight or monitoring failures. The operative question is what the
recognition of this obligation means for corporate directors and their
constituents.
Disney V is the culmination of extensive judicial exploration of the
19
limits of section 102(b)(7). As a practical matter, the statute created
an environment in which directors had little risk of liability for
breach of fiduciary duty unless they engaged in the kind of
impermissible self-dealing traditionally prohibited by the duty of
20
loyalty.
Virtually every major corporation accepted section
18. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(approving settlement agreement between parties). The Caremark decision is
discussed infra Part II.A.2. The Delaware Supreme Court’s location of the good faith
obligation within the duty of loyalty was far from a foregone conclusion. Some
Chancery Court decisions, see, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505-07 (Del.
Ch. 2003), discussed good faith in terms of the duty of loyalty. Other opinions,
however, including some Delaware Supreme Court decisions, referred to good faith
as an element of the “triad[] of . . . fiduciary duties—good faith, loyalty or due care”
applicable to the conduct of corporate directors. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), or as one of directors’ “three primary duties.”
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001). Although Chancellor
Chandler characterized an absence of good faith as “disloyal” conduct in Disney IV,
he described the underlying allegations as either “sounding in the fiduciary duty of
loyalty,” or as examples of “severe violations of the fiduciary duty of care.” Disney IV,
907 A.2d 755 n.463. Significant scholarly commentary anticipated that good faith
would emerge as an independent duty.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 5-6;
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 482-83 (2004); see also
sources cited infra note 28. Perhaps most significantly, section 102(b)(7)(i) contains
a specific exclusion for disloyal acts and omissions separate and apart from acts or
omissions “not in good faith.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006), set forth
in pertinent part infra text accompanying note 156. If violations of the duty to act in
good faith comprise a species of disloyalty, it is hard to understand why the Delaware
legislature provided separate exclusions for each in section 102(b)(7). Cf., Guttman,
823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (suggesting legislature amendment of section 102(b)(7) to
clarify that all of the exclusions set forth in its subsections pertain to disloyal
conduct).
19. See, e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 505-07 (discussing possible bases for Caremarktype claims); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (noting purpose
of section 102(b)(7) to protect directors from personal liability for damages arising
from violation of duty of care but not against damage liability arising from violation
of duty of loyalty or bad faith claims); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061 (Del.
1996) (finding that section 102(b)(7) amendment to corporation’s certificate of
incorporation protected directors from liability for monetary damages for good faith
omissions); O’Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 914 (Del. Ch.
1999) (noting established rule that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability
for good faith actions even if they violate the duty of care).
20. While WorldCom’s twelve outside directors paid more than twenty-four
million dollars to resolve claims against them as a result of the accounting fraud that
led to the company’s bankruptcy, and Enron’s outside directors paid thirteen
million, a recent article based on empirical data suggests that “out-of-pocket liability
for outside directors over the last several decades has been rare” and that even now
“their risk remains very low.” Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner,
Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1138-39 (2006); see also Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267-68 (1999)
[hereinafter Social Norms] (noting the reduced threat of directorial liability even in
the presence of exceptions to exculpatory statutes); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod,
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102(b)(7)’s invitation to protect its directors from personal liability
21
for breach of the duty of care. Consequently, for the directors of
most large public corporations, the enactment of section 102(b)(7)
and its counterparts in other states transformed the duty of care into
22
an aspirational objective rather than a standard of liability.
The tide began to turn against directors following the corporate
23
scandals that nearly brought down Caremark and Columbia/HCA
24
In the course of the litigation that followed,
in the 1990s.
shareholders contended that the good faith exception to section
102(b)(7) provided a basis for holding directors liable for sleeping at
25
the switch.
These cases sparked an important doctrinal
development, one that the corporate world has watched with
particular interest in the wake of Enron’s collapse and the other
26
major financial debacles that have occurred since 2001. Since the
27
Delaware Chancery Court’s 1996 decision in Caremark, both courts
and commentators have debated whether good faith ultimately would

Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS.
L. REV. 393, 394-95 (2005) [hereinafter Spare the Rod] (observing apparent social
agreement against major directorial liability, even in light of recent corporate
scandals). See generally E. Norman Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in
Light of Current Events, 19 No. 2 INSIGHTS 9, 15-16 (2005) [hereinafter Perspective]
(agreeing with statement attributed to Vice Chancellor Strine that “Independent
directors who apply themselves to their duties in good faith have a trivial risk of legal
liability”).
21. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 752.
22. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 (distinguishing statutory corporate duties from
“aspirational goals of ideal corporate practice”). Even the kind of inattention to
directorial duties previously excepted from the protection of the business judgment
rule in cases such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (N.J. 1981)
(abdication of directorial duties violates duty of care), arguably fell within the
purview of the exculpatory provisions authorized by the statute prior to the courts’
recognition of the significance of the good faith exception to section 102(b)(7). See
discussion infra Part III.A.
23. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(approving settlement agreement between parties). These cases are discussed infra
Part II.A.2.
24. See McCall v. Scott (McCall I), 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), amended on denial
of reh’g by McCall II, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001).
25. See McCall II, 250 F.3d at 1001; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968. See generally David
H. Cook, The Emergence of Delaware’s Good Faith Fiduciary Duty: In re Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 91, 94 (2004) (noting that
Caremark “was perhaps the first significant case to breathe life into the duty of good
faith”).
26. See Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1235 (2003) (“Enron “serve[d] as a ‘perfect storm’ metaphor that the
checks and balances in the American system of corporate governance [were] not
working . . . .”). For a litany of the events that took place in 2002 in the wake of the
Enron debacle, see Year of Scandals, Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6 (listing 2002
events related to corporate managerial misfeasance).
27. 698 A.2d at 971.
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28

emerge as an independent fiduciary obligation. In Disney V, the
Delaware Supreme Court responded that, like loyalty and care, good
faith is an element of “the triad of fiduciary duties” applicable to
29
corporate directors. While the court’s recent opinion in Stone v.
Ritter describes this particular reference as “colloquial” and backs
away from characterizing the good faith obligation as a “direct” basis
30
for liability, the Stone court stresses that a “director cannot act loyally
toward a corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her
31
actions are in the corporation’s best interest.” Thus, a director’s
“conscious disregard for [directorial] responsibilities. . . is properly
treated as a nonexculpable, nonindemnifiable violation of the
32
fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”
The purpose of this Article is to explore the parameters and
potential impact of the good faith standard articulated in Disney V
and clarified in Stone. Part I begins with a brief review of the
historical impact of the tension between entrepreneurial freedom
and managerial accountability, and Part II explains why the Disney
standard differs significantly from the traditional understanding of
good faith as the absence of subjective bad faith. Part III points out
that the court’s use of the language of bad faith to articulate the new
good faith may undercut the effectiveness of the standard. It urges
further clarification of the difference between the absence of good
faith and the presence of bad faith to ensure that the Disney standard
will not be reduced to a mere semantic variation on the traditional
duty of loyalty applicable only in the presence of improper—i.e.,
subjectively “bad”—motivation. Finally, Part IV examines the Disney
standard’s potential to serve as a vehicle for restoring trust in
corporate directors and argues that the “new” good faith has the
capacity to serve this important function, but only if the courts utilize
the doctrine to require corporate directors to engage actively in
oversight of the business and affairs of the entities entrusted to them.
In the words of Chancellor Chandler, where corporate directors
28. Hillary Sale wrote the first in-depth analysis of the recent emergence of the
duty of good faith in 2004. See Sale, supra note 18, at 456. Former Delaware Chief
Justice Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo discussed the emerging duty of good faith
in a 2005 article recounting developments in Delaware’s corporate law during his
tenure on the court. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6. In addition, Melvin
Eisenberg published a comprehensive analysis in 2006 shortly before the Delaware
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Disney V. See Good Faith in Corporate Law,
supra note 6. A number of other commentators also published helpful articles prior
to Disney V. See sources cited infra note 229.
29. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995).
30. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
31. Id. (quoting Gutman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
32. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
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consciously disregard their duties, “the law must be strong enough to
33
intervene against abuse of trust.”
I. FROM ROBBER BARONS TO THE WIDOW PRITCHARD: THE
STRUGGLE TO BALANCE MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY WITH
ENTREPRENEURIAL FREEDOM
Every jurisdiction requires directors to be loyal to the corporations
they manage and to exercise care in the conduct of corporate
business. These fiduciary mandates—known as the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care—are set forth in judicial decisions and state
34
corporations codes.
They do not, however, describe precise
standards. On the contrary, the operation of these fiduciary duties
often depends on context interpreted through the lens of the core
principle that directors must act in good faith in a manner that they
35
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of their corporations.
Until recently, however, courts seldom invoked good faith as a basis
for holding directors personally liable; they certainly did not identify
36
good faith as a fiduciary duty in its own right. A brief review of the
relevant historical background helps to explain how and why the
need for a new articulation of the good faith standard arose.
A. The Corporate Form and Its Abuses
A corporation’s board of directors has ultimate responsibility for
37
the management of its business. While directors rely on officers to
manage the company’s day-to-day affairs, the board itself is the
highest decision-making authority, except as to those few key matters
38
left to shareholders.
The law, however, has struggled with the
question of how to hold directors, particularly outside directors,
39
accountable for fulfilling their critical role.
The roots of this
struggle date back to the emergence of the modern corporation and
the quest to regulate both the external power and the internal

33. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 275.
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 141 (2006); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 2006); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2006).
35. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66; see also, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2005).
36. See Cook, supra note 25, at 92-93 (describing emerging Delaware good faith
obligation as an independent fiduciary duty).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006) (detailing the composition and
managerial powers and functions of board of directors); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01 (2005).
38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 275 (requiring shareholder vote in
context of mergers and dissolutions respectively).
39. See Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 408-09, 453-55.
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management of corporate entities without unduly compromising
40
either efficiency or innovation.
In the earliest period of American legal history, business
corporations were publicly chartered, principally for public utility
purposes; in the period from 1780 to 1801, nearly two-thirds of
special state corporations charters were for inland navigation,
turnpikes and toll roads, while fewer than four percent were for
41
general business corporations. As Lawrence Friedman notes, in the
entire eighteenth century only 335 businesses were granted corporate
42
charters. Their purposes were circumscribed, and, unlike modern
corporations, their periods of duration were fixed, rather than
43
perpetual. As the eighteenth century drew to a close, however, the
new nation needed credit and a transportation infrastructure to
44
facilitate growth and development. The corporate form was well
suited to meet these needs, and by the 1820s merchants and
45
manufacturers, too, began to adopt the corporate form. It was not
until later in the nineteenth century, however, that technological
advances—most notably the railroads—gave corporations “a
46
commanding position in the economy [that t]hey never lost.” The
corporate form enabled business people “to expand their operations
47
beyond what a few individuals could fund, manage, and carry out,”
permitting them “to elicit ongoing investment of human capital by
specialized managers, along with committed financial capital from
48
financial advisors.”
The corporate structure provided a legal
framework ideally suited to amassing the vast sums necessary to

40. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 390-400 (3d ed.
2005) (outlining development of corporate law).
41. J. W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 17 (1970).
42. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 129 (noting that most colonial corporate
charters were for “churches, charities, or cities or boroughs”); see also Margaret M.
Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1,
4-6 (2004) (discussing the emergence of the corporate form).
43. Id. at 131.
44. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1492-93 (1998) (documenting historical backdrop of the
emergence of corporations in the United States).
45. Id.
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 390.
47. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 387, 427 (2003).
48. Id.; See also Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of Corporations to
1832, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 56-57 (2002) (tracing emergence of fundamental
attributes of American corporations in conjunction with industrial development);
Blair, supra note 42, at 27 (corporate form “facilitates the locking-in of invested
capital”).
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develop capital-intensive industries and to facilitate accomplishment
49
of business and financial objectives.
In 1795, North Carolina enacted a statute permitting incorporation
50
without a public charter.
By 1850 a number of states allowed
incorporation for a limited business purpose, and by 1875 permission
51
to incorporate for “any lawful purpose” had become common. As
legal historian Lawrence Friedman explains, “[n]o longer was the
business corporation a unique, ad hoc creation. . . . Rather, it was
becoming the general form in which to cast the organization of one’s
business—legally open to all, and with few real restrictions on entry,
52
duration, and management.”
In 1933, Justice Brandeis wrote that states long restricted freedom
to incorporate because “[t]here was a sense of some insidious
menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when
53
held by corporations.”
During the latter part of the nineteenth
century, these early concerns seemed warranted; abuses proliferated
and engendered considerable disenchantment—particularly with
54
large corporations and the infamous robber barons who ran them.
There were many causes for concern, but two were primary. First,
across the nation many Americans protested that corporations had
55
gained far too much power over the economy as a whole.
The
monopolistic practices of the “trusts” became a national scandal as
corporate leviathans began to undermine the competitiveness and
56
efficiency of the very markets that gave birth to them. Congress
57
responded by passing the Sherman Act in 1890, and in 1906 and
1907 President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration initiated the

49. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 394-95.
50. 1 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
2, at 8 (Perm. Ed. 1999).
51. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 n.2, 555 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Until the latter date, “the duration of corporate franchises was
generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50 years.” Id. at 555. As late as 1903,
almost half the states limited the duration to 20 or 50 years. Id. at 555 n.29.
52. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 390-91.
53. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391-93 (illustrating legislative and judicial
reactions to such abuses). The classic early account is MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE
ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS (1934).
55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 392.
56. See id. at 399-400. See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1452 (“The public’s anticorporate sentiment stemmed from the very thing that made corporations successful:
their ability to concentrate capital.”).
57. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
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antitrust actions that led to the break-up of the huge Standard Oil
58
and American Tobacco trusts in 1911.
59
In the words of
Second, financial fraud was commonplace.
Lawrence Friedman, “[t]he investment market was totally
unregulated; no SEC kept it honest, and the level of morality among
promoters was painfully low, to put it mildly. It was a generation of
60
vultures. . . . The investing public was unmercifully fleeced.” Often
61
state legislatures seemed “supine [and] powerless.” Eventually, in
the wake of the disastrous stock market crash of 1929, Congress
62
enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
63
of 1934 to address abuses in the issuance and trading of securities
issues.
As is evident from these developments, in the latter part of the
nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, there was
considerable public distrust of large corporations and those who
64
managed them.
The focus of these concerns, however, was
primarily on the consequences of business power—the danger of
65
monopolies and the unabashed exploitation of the public. While
the ability to accumulate capital under the corporate form facilitated
these abuses, the corporate form itself was not the object of
66
reformers’ attentions.
The legal responses entailed external
limitations on corporate power—such as the prohibition of

58. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81-82 (1911)
(upholding decision finding defendants’ actions combining their oil company stock
to constitute an attempt to monopolize the oil industry and a restraint of trade);
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184-85 (1911) (finding defendants
in violation of antitrust laws and ordering lower court to develop a plan for
dissolution of combination).
59. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 392.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006).
63. Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
64. What mattered to the public, however, was not necessarily the concern of
businessmen. As Professor Hurst put it, “from the late 1880’s into the 1930’s, [w]e
treated the corporate instrument as so useful for desired economic growth as to
warrant using law to make it available on terms most responsive to businessmen’s
needs or wishes.” HURST, supra note 41, at 62. Hurst further stated that “utility
rather than the responsibility aspect of legitimacy dominated development of public
policy toward the business corporation . . . .” Id. Although the law of corporations
was responsive to the needs of business during the period, the statement is
questionable from a broader perspective. While the administrations of Warren
Harding and Calvin Coolidge were universally regarded as “pro-business,” the
Progressive Era administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
sponsored a number of reforms to which corporate leaders were inveterately hostile.
65. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 391.
66. See id. at 399 (noting policy focus on regulation rather than restructuring
corporations).
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67

monopoly and other abuses in the antitrust laws and the issuance
68
and trading requirements established by the Securities Act of 1933
69
But these measures
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
usually did not directly impact corporate governance structures.
Today, we are once again in the throes of a crisis in corporate trust,
70
but the nature of the principal concerns is dramatically different.
Since the last decades of the twentieth century, the genesis of the
dominant problem has been internal rather than external corporate
power—a failure of corporate governance structures and standards to
71
prevent flagrant abuses by insiders at many different levels. Today,
governance, particularly the relationship between directors and
shareholder-investors, is necessarily a central concern of corporate
72
law.
B. The Role of Directors in Corporate Governance
The original model for defining the director-shareholder
73
relationship emerged from the law of trusts. This is not surprising,
for the duty of a trustee is a paradigm for allocation of fiduciary
responsibilities in cases where one person holds money or property
74
on behalf of another. In addition, the rules governing financial
trusts were already well established by the time courts began to define
75
the core relationships of corporate governance. Consequently, the
76
potential fit appealed to courts and commentators.
There was
significant support for the idea that a corporate manager should be
“a trustee—a guardian,” with “every shareholder . . . [as] his ward”
and, at least in cases of large public enterprises, “the community [as]
77
his cestui qui trust.”
A number of nineteenth-century judicial
decisions reflect a similar propensity to invoke the law of trusts in the
78
corporate arena.

67. See id. at 346-49.
68. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (1997 & Supp. 2006).
69. Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
70. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1235-36 (pointing to Enron as an
illustration of control failure in corporate structure).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 363 (discussing “tidal wave” of
corporate governance crises and regulatory reforms engendered by recent scandals).
73. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 393.
74. Id. at 393-94.
75. Id. at 393-95.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 394 (quoting Charles Francis Adams, Jr.).
78. See id. (citing Ark. Valley Agric. Soc’y v. Eichholtz, 25 P. 613 (Kan. 1891);
Marshall v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586 (Va. 1889)).
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The conservative rules of the trust approach, however, did not fit
79
the entrepreneurial mold of corporate capitalism and its captains.
As the twentieth century dawned and the corporate form became
80
increasingly popular, corporations began to grow and diversify. It
was evident that the skills that made individuals successful business
directors were not necessarily the same qualities that made good
81
trustees. It soon became clear that saddling corporate directors with
the kinds of standards applicable to the guardians of trusts and
82
This approach
eleemosynary institutions was counterproductive.
suited neither the needs of evolving business corporations nor the
83
objectives of their investors.
Consequently, the courts began to
84
develop a separate set of principles for corporate management.
As the law of corporate governance evolved, what remained of the
trustee model was the idea that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the
85
corporation, and, indirectly, to its shareholders.
The principal
components of this fiduciary obligation emerged as the duty of loyalty
86
and the duty of care. Courts and legislatures defined and refined the
87
parameters of these duties over time. The duty of loyalty came to be
epitomized in the oft-cited language of Judge Cardozo in his famous
88
1928 opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon —“the punctilio of an honor the
89
While an absolute prohibition of transactions
most sensitive.”
between a corporation and its officers or directors proved
90
undesirable for a variety of reasons, the principle of transparency
provided for disclosure of conflicting interests and recusal of
91
interested directors from the decision-making process. Thus, the
law required directors to put the well-being of the corporation before
their personal interests, although in its classic application the duty of
loyalty became principally associated with “a financial or other
79. Id.
80. Id. at 395-96.
81. Id. at 393-94.
82. Id. at 394.
83. Id. at 394-95.
84. See, e.g., id. at 394 (discussing early judicial attempts to rein in corporate
directors and officers (citing Ark. Valley Agric. Soc’y v. Eichholtz, 25 P. 613 (Kan. 1891);
Marshall v. Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586 (Va. 1889))).
85. See id. at 393.
86. See, e.g., Hintmann, supra note 10, at 577-79 (identifying fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care).
87. See, e.g., id.
88. 164 N.E. 545, 548-49 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a
share of the proceeds from the defendant’s purchase of a leasehold estate because
the opportunity arose in connection with the parties’ joint “coadventure”).
89. Id. at 546.
90. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8F cmt. (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 170(1) (2003).
91. See Hintmann, supra note 10, at 578.
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92

cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.” With respect to the duty of
care, the courts struggled to strike the proper balance between
93
The
entrepreneurial freedom and managerial accountability.
solution that emerged, the fundamental rule of judicial review of
94
corporate decisions, became known as the business judgment rule.
1.

The business judgment rule and the gutting of the duty of care
The business judgment rule is “the foundation of our corporation
95
Its practical function, however, is to limit significantly the
law.”
demands imposed by the duty of care, because it “teaches that courts
will not second-guess directors’ business decisions and will not
interfere with the expectation of investors that directors will take
honest and prudent business risks to advance the economic well96
being of the enterprise.” The conceptual underpinning of early
iterations of the business judgment rule was virtually identical to the
policy considerations invoked today: business is most likely to
succeed and flourish when business managers are free to make
decisions unfettered by outside interference or judicial second97
guessing.
98
The famous case of Shlensky v. Wrigley illustrates the deference
courts accord management decisions pursuant to the business
judgment rule. As baseball aficionados and students of corporate law
92. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006); see
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 578 (noting that “[a]t common law a transaction
involving conflicts of interest was void or voidable[, and that m]odern courts have
been more lenient, but they still require the self-dealing director to act with the
utmost good faith and scrupulous fairness” (citing DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 130-38 (4th ed.
1993 & Supp. 1995)).
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 129 (2004).
94. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 396.
95. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1442.
96. Id. See also Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 129 (“Choosing the appropriate
balance between authority and accountability is the central problem of business
judgment jurisprudence.”). For an analysis of the ongoing tension between authority
and accountability in corporate governance, see id. at 107-09.
The policy
justifications for the business judgment rule—encouraging qualified persons to serve
as directors and to take appropriate risks, judicial restraint, and preservation of the
board’s role in governing corporations—arguably differ when the actions at issue are
those of officers rather than directors. For a discussion of reasons why the rule
should not apply to the actions of officers, see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 455-69 (2005).
97. See generally ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS § 12.2.2 at 204 (5th ed. 2006);
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 575 (noting that “[r]eluctance toward second-guessing
business decisions dates back more than 250 years in English law to The Charitable
Corp. v. Sutton [(1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch.)] and the 1829 Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Percy v. Millaudon [8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829)]”).
98. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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are well aware, in the late 1960’s the Chicago Cubs remained the only
99
major league team that did not play home games at night. Shlensky,
a minority shareholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club,
Inc. (“the Cubs”), challenged the refusal of the Cubs’ board to outfit
the stadium for night games. Shlensky attributed operating losses to
100
inadequate attendance at home.
At the time, all nineteen other
101
major league baseball teams played under the lights.
The Cubs’ directors denied Shlensky’s contention that their
decision was based on the idiosyncratic preferences of president and
majority shareholder Philip K. Wrigley, rather than good business.
The directors claimed that the potentially deleterious impact of night
games on the neighborhood surrounding the Cubs’ stadium justified
102
their approach.
The Illinois Appellate Court upheld a trial court
decision in the directors’ favor. The court stressed that shareholders
elect directors to exercise business judgment. It emphasized that
“the decision [was] one properly before directors and the motives
alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or
conflict of interests in their making of that decision,” and that “unless
the conduct of the defendants at least borders on one of [those]
103
elements, the courts should not interfere.” The court concluded by
admonishing against judicial interference with board decisions in the
104
absence of “a clear showing of dereliction of duty.”
Shlensky and other decisions emphasizing the importance of
entrepreneurial freedom make it clear that the business judgment
105
rule is a process-oriented standard.
As Delaware’s former Chief
Justice Veasey recently explained, “the focus of the business judgment
rule remains on the process that directors use in reaching their
106
decisions.” Clearly, the latitude afforded to directors under the
business judgment rule differs from the constraints the law of trusts
imposes on trustees. Moreover, the business judgment rule provides
corporate directors with a degree of protection unavailable to most of

99. Id. at 777. The Cubs eventually played the first night game at Wrigley Field
on August 8, 1988. See Chicago Cubs website, http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/NAS
App/mlb/chc/ballpark/index.jsp.
100. 237 N.E.2d. at 777-78.
101. Id. at 777.
102. Id. at 778.
103. Id. at 780.
104. Id. at 779.
105. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch.
1996)(“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by deep
respect for all good faith board decisions.”).
106. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1421.
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those who receive compensation for their services in other fields.
The rationale for applying the business judgment rule, however,
breaks down when directors fail to fulfill their basic obligation to pay
attention to the affairs of the entities they manage.

2. The problem of dereliction of directorial duty
As corporate law developed, another species of disputes about
fiduciary responsibilities emerged involving allegations of disregard
108
or dereliction of directorial duties. In Barnes v. Andrews, for
example, Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a director could be liable
109
for “general inattention to his duties as a director.”
Judge Hand
reached this conclusion even though the integrity of the defendant
110
director was “unquestioned.” Although “[n]o men of sense would
take the office [of director], if the law imposed upon them a guaranty
of the general success of their companies as a penalty for any
111
negligence,” the defendant director “had allowed himself to be
112
carried along as a figurehead”
without adequately informing
113
himself of the corporation’s business affairs. The director escaped
liability, even though the court could not “acquit [him] of misprision
114
in his office,” because it concluded that there was no evidence that
the director’s inattention had caused the mortal harm suffered by the
115
company.
More than fifty years later, the issue of directorial inattention arose
116
in another well known case, Francis v. United Jersey Bank.
In an
107. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in Joy v.
North:
Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed
or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to
economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will
rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation.
Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon
corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance
to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally
labeled the business judgment rule.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982). See also infra text accompanying notes
341-345.
108. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
109. Id. at 615.
110. Id. at 616.
111. Id. at 617.
112. Id. at 616.
113. Id. at 615-16.
114. Id. at 616.
115. Id. at 617-18.
116. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). Although the company was incorporated in New
York, the court applied New Jersey law because “New Jersey had more significant
relationships to the parties and the transactions than New York.” Id. at 820. This
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unusual state of affairs, the proverbial poor widow was the defendant
rather than the plaintiff. Following her husband’s death, Mrs. Lillian
Pritchard and her two sons served as directors of the family
reinsurance brokerage business; the two sons were also officers of the
117
company.
Although her late husband had warned Mrs. Pritchard
118
that their son Charles, Jr. “would take the shirt off my back,” she
neglected her directorial duties, preferring instead to focus her
attention on her gin. While their mother was asleep at the switch, the
boys misappropriated large sums of money and soon drove the
119
company into bankruptcy.
The trustees in bankruptcy sued Mrs. Pritchard for breach of
fiduciary duty and continued the action against her estate following
120
her death.
Remarking that “[t]he sentinel asleep at his post
121
contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect,” the
New Jersey Supreme Court held Mrs. Pritchard’s estate liable for her
breach of the duty of care because of a complete failure to perform
122
her duties as a director.
In so doing, the court upheld the trial
court’s rejection of the argument that Mrs. Pritchard should be
excused because she was simply a poor widow, overwhelmed by grief
123
and exploited by wicked children.
The high court held that, as a
director, Mrs. Pritchard was obligated to “discharge [her] duties in
good faith and act as ordinarily prudent person would under similar
124
circumstances in like positions.”
Unlike Judge Hand in Barnes v.
125
Andrews, the Francis court found that the plaintiffs had established
126
causation for their losses.
In so doing the court warned: “A
director is not an ornament, but an essential component of corporate
governance. Consequently, a director cannot protect himself behind
127
a paper shield bearing the motto, ‘dummy director.’”
Barnes and Francis illustrate a judicial reluctance to interpret the
business judgment rule to bar actions against directors who fail to
choice of law was contrary to the internal affairs doctrine, under which the law of the
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of a corporation.
117. Id. at 818.
118. Id. at 819.
119. Id. at 818-19.
120. Id. at 816.
121. Id. at 822.
122. Id. at 819.
123. Mrs. Pritchard had never paid attention to the business; her husband ran the
company until his death. After he died, she apparently suffered from a form of acute
depression, became bedridden, and began to drink heavily. Id. at 819-20.
124. Id. at 819.
125. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
126. 432 A.2d at 826-29 (explaining that determining causation is a matter of both
law and common sense).
127. Id. at 823 (citing Campbell, 62 N.J. Eq. at 443).
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exercise their managerial authority. By the latter part of the
twentieth century the courts had also begun to limit the application
of the business judgment rule in other important respects. For
128
example, in Joy v. North the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit expounded at length on the rule in the context of a
duty of care action against the directors of Citytrust Bank. On the
recommendation of Citytrust’s chief executive officer (“CEO”), the
bank’s board had repeatedly approved extensions of significant
amounts of credit to a real estate developer with whom the CEO had
129
a personal relationship.
When the developer defaulted, thereby
inflicting a major loss on the bank, a group of shareholders filed a
derivative action claiming that the directors had breached their duty
130
of care by approving the loans.
The court rejected the defendant
directors’ argument that their actions were protected by the business
judgment rule, explaining that:
the business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which
justify its existence. Thus, it does not apply in cases, e.g., in which
the corporation lacks a business purpose, is tainted by a conflict of
interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or
results from an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight
131
or supervision.

In ruling that Citytrust’s directors could be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty, the Joy Court rebuffed the outside directors’ protest
that “they had neither information nor reasonable notice of the
132
problems raised by the [loan] transactions.”
The court
admonished:
[L]ack of knowledge is not necessarily a defense, if it is the result of
an abdication of directional responsibility. Directors who willingly
allow others to make major decisions affecting the future of the
corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may not
defend on their lack of knowledge, for that ignorance itself is a
133
breach of fiduciary duty.

Joy v. North is significant because it is one of the few cases in which a
court upheld a challenge to a board decision for reasons grounded
more in substantive irrationality than procedural shortcomings.
Although the law of Connecticut, rather than that of Delaware,
governed the decision, Joy v. North offered an inkling of major issues
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 886 (citations omitted).
Id. at 896.
Id. (citations omitted).
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about to surface in corporate fiduciary law—outside directors’
ignorance, inattention, or undue deference to insiders. The court’s
willingness to wade into these waters also presaged the course the
Delaware Supreme Court would soon take in trying to prevent the
business judgment rule from wholly swallowing the duty of care.
Appropriately, the real storm over the parameters of the modern duty
of care broke in Delaware.
3. Smith v. Van Gorkom: the judicial earthquake and its aftermath
134
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court halted the
progressive advance of the business judgment rule and attempted to
breathe new life into the duty of care. In September of 1980, Jerome
Van Gorkom, Trans Union’s chairman and CEO, asked the board to
consider an offer from Pritzker Corp. to purchase Trans Union stock
135
at a price of $55 per share.
The offer ostensibly came with a very
tight time limitation that required prompt action by Trans Union’s
136
board.
The directors approved the cash-out merger proposal on
the basis of Van Gorkom’s twenty-minute account of his negotiations
137
The directors did not review any
with Pritzker representatives.
documentation of the proposed terms and underlying financial data
138
or consult the company’s investment advisers.
Trans Union’s
directors were well qualified and highly accomplished business
139
people.
Nevertheless, when a shareholder derivative action
challenging the board’s decision reached the Delaware Supreme
Court, the majority decided to put some bite back into the duty of
care. The court held Trans Union’s directors personally liable for
gross negligence in breach of the duty of care on the ground that
they had failed to inform themselves properly before voting to
140
proceed with the merger.
The analytical portion of the majority’s opinion in Van Gorkom
begins with a standard obeisance to the business judgment rule. The

134. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
135. Id. at 867.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 868.
138. Id. at 868-69 (observing that such documents were not even available for
review prior to the meeting).
139. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (noting that the Trans Union directors
“had collectively been employed by the Company for 116 years and had 68 years of
combined experience as directors”).
140. Id. at 881. The directors were also held liable for gross negligence in
approving amendments to the merger proposal and for relinquishing their freedom
to recommend to the stockholders that the merger offer be turned down. Id. at 88384, 887-88.
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141

court cited Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado as a reminder that “[t]he
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and
free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
142
directors.” Subsequently, however, in a decided twist on the Illinois
Appellate Court’s deferential language in Shlensky, Delaware’s highest
court admonished that “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires
143
more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud.”
The court
continued: “[r]epresentation of the financial interests of others
imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests
and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type
144
and under the circumstances present here.” After clarifying that a
failure to make an informed business judgment violated the duty of
care rather than the duty of loyalty, the court confirmed that “gross
negligence” was the relevant standard in determining whether the
145
directors breached that duty. It then proceeded to analyze the facts
and circumstances of the Trans Union merger, concluding that “the
Board lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed
business judgment as to the fairness of [Pritzker’s offer] for sale of
146
the Company.
The court’s decision shook the foundations of the corporate
147
As the decision’s aftershocks rippled through boardrooms
world.
across the country, Delaware’s legislature reacted quickly to this
148
perceived judicial invasion of the realm of business professionals.
Within months, both chambers of the General Assembly passed, and
the governor signed, legislation amending Delaware’s corporate code
in an effort to undo the damage wrought by what a dissenting justice
149
called the Van Gorkom majority’s “comedy of errors.”
C. Protecting Directors from the Courts: Delaware’s Exculpation Statute
Delaware’s new statute, codified as section 102(b)(7) of the state’s
General Corporation Law, eviscerated Van Gorkom by permitting
corporations to limit, or even eliminate, the personal liability of
150
directors for almost all breaches of the duty of care. The legislative
history of the statute is sparse, but it is clear that the legislature’s
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
488 A.2d at 872 (citing Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872-73 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
Id. at 878.
See, e.g., Sale, supra note 18, at 466 n.58.
Id. at 466-67.
488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
For the text of section 102(b)(7), see infra text accompanying note 153.
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objective was to undo a decision that many believed would discourage
151
There was
qualified people from serving as corporate directors.
also concern that Van Gorkom would result in a prohibitive increase in
the cost of directors’ and officers’ insurance. The new statute
152
responded to these anxieties.
Section 102(b)(7) provides in
pertinent part that a Delaware corporation’s certificate of
incorporation may contain:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that
such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law; (iii) under section 174 of this Title [unlawful
distributions]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director
153
derived an improper personal benefit.

The structure of the provision is significant. In keeping with
Delaware’s traditional approach to corporate law, section 102(b)(7)
is essentially an enabling statute that permits corporations to add
provisions to their charters protecting directors from personal
154
liability for failure to fulfill their fiduciary duties.
The statute,
however, precludes limitation of liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty, intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, reaping
improper personal benefit from transactions (presumably a subset of
151. See, e.g., Hintmann, supra note 10, at 586-88; E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on
Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century,
12 WASH. U. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2003) (commenting on the obvious relationship
between Van Gorkom and the enactment of the Delaware statute).
152. See RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYUN, FOLK ON
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102, n.55 and accompanying text (2001); see
also Bruner, Christopher M., “Good Faith,” State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of
Director Liability in Corporate Law (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 0519, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832944.
153. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006).
154. For a discussion of Delaware’s corporation law as an enabling statute, see
What Happened in Delaware, supra note 5, at 1411. See also E. Norman Veasey, Should
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice Versa?,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179-80 (2001) (positing that the flexibility of the Delaware
enabling model makes it superior to mandatory corporate law rules); E. Norman
Veasey, Essay, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Principles, 56 S.M.U. L. REV.
2135, 2139-40 (2003) (explaining that Delaware’s statute is based upon trust that
executives will act rationally and with integrity in pursuing the best interests of
stockholders); E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron
WorldCom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 843 (2003) (arguing that the
most effective way to protect stockholders is to ensure directors’ independence). In
addition, as former Chief Justice Veasey observes, Delaware’s corporate code
“create[s] only a skeletal framework. . . . The ‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is
judge-made.” Id.
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disloyal actions), or making unlawful distributions of corporate
155
These exclusions are fairly straightforward. The exception
assets.
“for acts or omissions not in good faith” set forth in the first part of
subsection (ii), however, is less so, because the concept of “good
156
faith” has always been somewhat amorphous in corporate law. It is
this language, rather than the disloyalty exclusion in subsection (i),
that provided the impetus for the evolution of the “new” good faith
and its recognition by the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney V.
157
While section 102(b)(7) does not bar injunctive relief,
the
exculpatory provisions it authorizes create an effective release from
personal liability for monetary damages as a result of directorial
158
carelessness—both
negligence
and
gross
negligence.
Consequently, section 102(b)(7) sounded the death knell of the duty
of care as an effective fiduciary standard constraining the conduct of
159
corporate directors.
Other jurisdictions were quick to follow Delaware’s lead. In the
course of the succeeding year, more than thirty states enacted similar
160
provisions, and all fifty states eventually did so.
In the blink of an
eye, virtually every major corporation accepted the invitation to
161
include an exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorporation.
The corporate world heaved a collective sigh of relief—at least until
the Caremark and Columbia/HCA fiascos made front-page news
162
across the country in the mid 1990s.
These corporate scandals
155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i), (iii)-(iv)(2006).
156. See Griffith, supra note 5 (pre-Disney description of the concept of good faith
as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard). In its decision in Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641
(Del. 2003), the court noted the difficulty of interpreting section 102(b)(7) because
it “creat[es] unnecessary conceptual confusion.” Id. at *39 n.133.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (permitting exculpation of directors
from personal liability without limitation of injunctive relief).
158. Id.
159. See Sale, supra note 18, at 458, 482-94 (suggesting that Delaware’s legislature
“abdicat[ed] part of its role in regulating corporate governance. . . . [by] allow[ing]
companies, at the directors’ initiative, to exempt [directors] from damages for failing
to adhere to their duty of care . . .”). For a discussion of the general decline of the
potency of the duty of care in Delaware, see Stephen J. Lubbin & Alana J. Darnell,
Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L 589, 591 (2006) (describing the duty of care
as “a rule that now requires little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of
relevant data”).
160. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004); see also Spare the Rod, supra
note 20, at 405 (highlighting trends in state law to limit director liability and
suggesting that the SEC proved unable to address fully the shortcomings of state
corporation law).
161. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005).
162. As a result of its criminal conviction and associated civil liability, Caremark
paid more than $160 million to the U.S. Government and other third parties. See
infra Part II.A.2.a.
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focused attention on the exceptions to the exculpatory language of
section 102(b)(7), particularly the good faith proviso. Subsequently,
163
Enron and the spectacular corporate debacles that followed
intensified pressure to hold outside directors accountable for
fiduciary lapses, and the brouhaha over Michael Ovitz’s exit from
Disney provided an admirable vehicle for exploring the limits of the
good faith exception.
The culmination of the Disney litigation—the Delaware Supreme
Court’s June 2006 decision—offers hope that the “new” good faith
will evolve to fill a significant gap in contemporary corporate law. If
the courts choose to confine its application as an enforceable legal
standard quite narrowly, the promise of the new good faith will soon
evaporate. But, if the courts utilize the Disney standard to hold
directors accountable for actually fulfilling the responsibilities they
knowingly accept in return for the payment, prestige and perquisites
164
that accompany seats on major corporate boards, the new good
faith has the potential to become a landmark in the evolution of
standards defining the conduct of corporate directors in Delaware
and—because of Delaware’s importance in American corporate law—
throughout the entire United States.
II. THE “NEW” GOOD FAITH
The Disney standard is the product of twenty years of development,
beginning with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v.
165
Van Gorkom and the Delaware General Assembly’s enactment of
166
section 102(b)(7) in reaction to that decision. The importance of
167
Disney V in this context lies in its recognition that directors of a
Delaware corporation have a fiduciary obligation to act in good faith
that does not conflate good faith with the duty of care, yet goes
beyond the mere obligation not to act with subjectively improper
168
motivation.
This richer obligation imposes upon directors an
163. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron,
Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (discussing the
impact of the Enron collapse in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks).
164. As Professor Johnson points out, the fiduciary duty of loyalty has the
potential to function across a broad spectrum “ranging from a minimalist aspect of
nonbetrayal to the more full-bodied dimension of affirmative devotion.” See Lyman
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 27, 30 (2004) [hereinafter Loyalty Discourse].
165. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2006).
167. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). For a complete list of the key decisions in
the Disney litigation, see supra note 14.
168. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66-67.
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affirmative duty to act where they have a known duty to do so.
Unfortunately, while it has noted this distinction, the Delaware
Supreme Court, like the Chancery Court, has at least troubled the
waters by using “bad faith” to define “good faith” within the meaning
of section 102(b)(7)(ii). Consequently, there is a significant risk that
the “failure-to-act test” could be equated with an older, different test,
namely a motivational inquiry. This Part argues that it would be
clearer to focus on an absence of good faith than to require a finding
of the presence of bad faith, given the baggage the latter term brings
with it. In any event, it is essential to articulate the required finding
clearly if the new good faith is to realize its full potential.
A. Closing the Accountability Gap
Van Gorkom and section 102(b)(7)
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that there
was no suggestion that the actions of Trans Union’s directors
constituted self-dealing or that they had not made their decision in
170
good faith. The court understood the case to implicate the duty of
171
The primary importance of the case
care, not the duty of loyalty.
for the new good faith arises not from the decision itself, but from
the Legislature’s response—section 102(b)(7)’s grant of permission
to Delaware corporations to shield their directors from liability for
money damages for breach of the duty of care, except for “acts or
172
omissions not in good faith.” The practical effect of the statute was
to protect directors and officers from liability for both negligent and
173
grossly negligent conduct. This legal regime effectively neutralized
1.

169. Id.; Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6-*7 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
170. 488 A.2d at 873.
171. Id. at 872-73. More particularly, the court held that the duty of care imposes
on directors the obligation “to act in an informed and deliberate manner,” and the
duty is breached where directors are found to have acted in a grossly negligent
fashion. Id. at 873.
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2006). Delaware has a similar
exclusion with respect to indemnification. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW tit. 8, § 145
(2006).
173. Professor Eisenberg has argued that standards of conduct and standards of
judicial review diverge in the law of corporate governance. He suggests that the duty
of care sets forth a standard of conduct for directors, but that the business judgment
rule provides a (much less-stringent) standard of review. See Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-49 (1993). A section 102(b)(7) provision operates in a
manner analogous to the business judgment rule: it does not affect a director’s duty
to act with care, but it denies courts the ability to impose personal monetary liability
as a consequence of careless conduct. While it is certainly true that business men
and women have moral duties not encompassed by legal requirements, standards of
review that are less stringent than standards of conduct make the standards of
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the duty of care as a check on directorial negligence.
174
inherently unstable because it went too far.
2.

It was

The rise of the new good faith
a.

Caremark

Although it is easy to view the rise of the new good faith as a
175
response to the corporate scandals of the Enron-WorldCom era, the
first major development was the Delaware Chancery Court’s
landmark 1996 decision in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
176
Litigation.
In Caremark, the parties asked the court to approve the
settlement of a shareholders’ derivative suit that arose after the
company had been indicted in connection with health care fraud.
Caremark agreed to settle with the government by pleading guilty to
one count and paying criminal fines and civil claims in an amount
177
totaling approximately $165 million. The directors had not known
about, and hence had not been in a position to stop, the
178
wrongdoing. The question was whether they should have known.
On the application to approve the settlement, the court’s
responsibility was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
179
plaintiffs’ claims.
The complaint did “not charge either director
self-dealing or the more difficult loyalty-type problems arising from
cases of suspect director motivation, such as entrenchment or sale of
conduct legally irrelevant. See also Gregory Scott Crespi, Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law: The Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 671
(2004) (criticizing the standard of conduct/standard of review distinction).
174. See supra text accompanying note 150.
175. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 7-8 (“The duty of good faith emerged in an
environment of sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of scandals—
including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, celebrity
insider trading, and corruption in the IPO market—drew American corporate
governance into question and plunged previously settled questions into heated
debate.”).
176. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Soon after the enactment of section
102(b)(7), in Barkan v. Amsted Indust., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989), the Delaware
Supreme Court approved the settlement of litigation involving a managementsponsored leveraged buyout. In discussing the directors’ good faith belief that the
shareholders were getting the best price, even in the absence of a market test, the
court stated that “the crucial element supporting a finding of good faith is
knowledge.” Id. at 1288. Because Barkan is an acquisition case, the reference to
good faith could point to what this Article calls the old good faith, namely, that the
directors’ action did not violate the duty of loyalty for being self-interested. Yet, it
also contains a hint, upon which later cases would build, that “good faith is more
closely associated with diligence, or the duty of care.” Ellen Taylor, New and
Unjustified Restrictions on Delaware Directors’ Authority, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 837, 881
(1996).
177. 698 A.2d at 965 n.10.
178. Id. at 971-72.
179. Id. at 961, 966-67.
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180

control contexts.” The court was not asked to rule directly on the
question whether the plaintiffs’ case was fatally weak because of the
presence of a section 102(b)(7) provision in the corporate certificate,
but it is clear that the Chancellor understood that this issue was
181
potentially present. Nevertheless, the court discussed the directors’
duties, in part, in light of good faith. Chancellor Allen distinguished
between two kinds of breach-of-duty-of-care cases—liability arising
either from a board decision that was ill-advised or negligent, or from
a board’s unconsidered failure to act where action would have
182
prevented the loss. In the first category, the business judgment rule
protected decisions that were the product of a process that was either
rational or “employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
183
interests.”
In the second category, the Chancellor determined that the board
had a duty to “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s
information and reporting system [was] in concept and design
adequate to assure the board that appropriate information [would]
come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary
184
operations, so that it [could] satisfy its responsibility.”
Without
deciding the impact of the presence of a section 102(b)(7)
exemption in the certificate, the Chancellor opined that failure to
attempt in good faith to assure that such a system was in place “under
185
some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for losses. . . .”
In the Caremark matter, however, the Chancellor noted that “the
corporation’s information systems appear[ed] to have represented a
186
good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts,” and there was
no significant evidence “of a sustained failure to exercise their
187
oversight function.”
Consequently, the Chancellor approved the
proposed settlement, even though it “provide[d] very modest
188
benefits.”

180. Id. at 967.
181. Caremark’s predecessor, Baxter International, Inc., had amended its certificate
of incorporation to include the liability exclusion authorized by section 102(b)(7).
As a result, the Chancellor opined that the claims asserted in the case “likely were
susceptible to a motion to dismiss in all events.” Id. at 971.
182. Id. at 967.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
185. Id. The court addressed the potential issue under section 102(b)(7), see id.
at 970 n.27.
186. Id. at 971.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 972.
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McCall
189

McCall v. Scott took the Caremark analysis a step further. McCall
was a shareholder derivative action in which the plaintiffs sought
damages from current and former directors for a number of
transgressions, including failing to prevent, and establishing policies
190
that sometimes promoted, widespread health care fraud.
The
plaintiffs alleged breach of the duty of care in connection with this
191
Consistent with then-existing Delaware case law, they
claim.
192
necessarily alleged that the directors’ conduct was grossly negligent.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, a Delaware company,
countered by citing its inclusion of the exculpatory provision
193
authorized by section 102(b)(7) in its certificate of incorporation.
In McCall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
applying Delaware law, had to resolve the question that Chancellor
Allen identified, but did not decide in Caremark: the legal effect of
the good faith exception for directors of a corporation that had
194
The
placed a section 102(b)(7) liability shield in its certificate
McCall court ruled that the good faith exception contained in section
102(b)(7)(ii) was not merely a hortatory cry for ethically appropriate
conduct, but a provision with real bite. The court, therefore, allowed
the plaintiffs to maintain an action alleging reckless misconduct on
195
the part of directors and officers of Columbia/HCA.
Section 102(b)(7)(ii) prohibits corporations from exempting
directors from personal ability for acts or omissions either “not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
196
violation of the law.” Because the facts alleged in McCall suggested
that the directors might have acted recklessly, but not intentionally,
the plaintiffs argued that the statutory phrase “intentional
197
misconduct” should be interpreted as encompassing recklessness.
The court rejected this contention, but it accepted the argument that
allegations of reckless misconduct brought the case within the
statute’s good faith exception “[t]o the extent that recklessness

189. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (“McCall I”), amended on denial of reh’g by McCall
v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (“McCall II”).
190. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 813-14.
191. Id. at 813, 817-19, 824-26. They also accused directors and officers of illegal
insider trading in violation of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 813.
192. Id. at 817 n.9; see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
193. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 818.
194. Id. at 818-19.
195. Id.
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
197. McCall I, 239 F.3d at 818.
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198

involves a conscious disregard of a known risk.” As the court stated
in its amended opinion, “while it is true that duty of care claims
alleging only grossly negligent conduct are precluded by a §
102(b)(7) waiver provision, it appears that duty of care claims based
199
on reckless or intentional misconduct are not.” The federal court
relied on a treatise on Delaware corporate law that stated: “To the
extent that recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a known
risk, it could be argued that such an approach is not one taken in
good faith and thus could not be liability exempted under the new
200
statute.”
On this basis, the court refused to dismiss the action
against the defendant directors despite the exculpatory provision in
201
the corporation’s certificate.
The court held that “[u]nder Delaware law, the duty of good faith
may be breached where a director consciously disregards his duties to
202
the corporation, thereby causing its stockholders to suffer.”
The
court did not have to decide whether the statute protected directors
from liability for unconsidered inaction. It found the allegations of
recklessness sufficient to fall within the statute. By embracing
recklessness as a basis for a breach of good faith capable of
eliminating section 102(b)(7) protection, the court opened the door
to a question quite different from the motivational inquiry required
203
by earlier ideas of good faith.
B. Disney, the Old Good Faith and the New Good Faith
During the late 1990s and the first years of the new century, a
number of Delaware Chancery Court decisions explored the limits of
the good faith exception to section 102(b)(7). From time to time,
the Delaware Supreme Court weighed in on related matters, but it
did not have occasion to determine the nature or parameters of the

198. Id. The court’s reason was its belief that the Delaware Supreme Court would
not interpret section 102(b)(7) in this way.
199. McCall II, 250 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 2001).
200. Id. at 1000-01 (quoting 1 BALLOTTI & FINKLESTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.29, at 4-116 to 4-116.1 (3d ed., Supp.
2000)).
201. Id. at 1001.
202. Id., citing Nagy v. Bistricer, No. Civ.A. 18017, 2000 WL 1759860, at *3 n.2 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 22, 2000).
203. See id. at 1001 (“[W]e find that [plaintiffs] have alleged a conscious disregard
of known risks, which conduct, if proven, cannot have been undertaken in good
faith.”); see also In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795
(7th Cir. 2003) (applying an Illinois statute modeled on section 102(b)(7) in
shareholders’ derivative suit and following McCall’s interpretation of good faith in a
case determining a question of failure to plead demand futility).
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204

obligation.
It was in the Disney litigation that the new good faith
took center stage.
All of the events relevant to the Disney dispute took place within a
single year, although the litigation they generated spanned nearly
ten. The driving force behind the hiring and then the firing of
205
Michael Ovitz was his long-time friend, Disney CEO Michael Eisner.
206
Ovitz’s performance at Disney was abysmal.
Yet the compensation
Ovitz received for this unsatisfactory service, including his
207
As
termination payout, amounted to approximately $140 million.
Chancellor Chandler, who tried the case, saw it, this was an instance
208
of “an imperial CEO” operating with a “supine or passive board.”
Shareholders sought to recover against the directors—Eisner for
orchestrating and the others, including the outside directors, for
permitting—this chain of events to occur. The gravamen of the
allegations against the directors, other than Eisner, was that they had
entirely neglected their duties. The trial court found that the
plaintiffs failed to prove their allegations. The Delaware Supreme
209
Court affirmed.
It is crucial to note that the plaintiffs did not allege that the
defendant directors acted on the basis of improper motivation. The
210
key issue at trial was about dereliction of duty.
This distinction is
important. Improper motivation traditionally falls within the rubric
of subjective bad faith; dereliction of duty does not. The two
concepts differ sharply. The old good faith addresses improper
motivation; the new good faith addresses dereliction of duty,
specifically, an “intentional failure to act in the face of a known duty
211
to act.” In the words of the Disney V court, such disregard of duty
constitutes “a nonexculpable, nonindemnifiable violation of the
212
fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”
To understand the new good
faith and the role it can play in the evolving law of corporate
governance requires a clear understanding of the difference between
the two. The following discussion examines Disney V’s new standard
in the context of discussions of good faith generally and then

204. See cases cited supra note 19.
205. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 35-42 (Del. 2006).
206. Id. at 42-46.
207. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). Ovitz’s severance payout alone was
approximately $130 million. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 27.
208. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 761 n.487.
209. Id. at 778-79.
210. Id. at 753-56.
211. Id. at 755.
212. 906 A.2d at 66.
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explores in greater detail the doctrine referred to as the “old” good
faith.
1.

Good faith: one doctrine or two?
In Disney V, the Delaware Supreme Court began its discussion of
good faith by stating that “at least three different categories of
fiduciary behavior are candidates for the ‘bad faith’ pejorative
213
One of these categories—the second in the court’s list—is
label.”
“lack of due care—that is, fiduciary action taken by reason of gross
214
The court easily
negligence and without any malevolent intent.”
rejected an approach that would read section 102(b)(7) to permit
holding directors liable for grossly negligent violations of the duty of
care. Although the court did not cite Van Gorkom in its discussion,
the court stated that allowing the statutory “good faith” exception to
permit directors to be held personally liable for gross negligence
“would eviscerate the protections accorded to directors by the
215
General Assembly’s adoption of Section 102(b)(7).”
The other two categories the court discussed, as well as the
differences between them, are central to the analysis here. Both are
viable ideas in corporate law. The first is “subjective bad faith,” that
is, fiduciary misconduct based on improper motivation. The second
encompasses “fiduciary conduct . . . which does not involve disloyalty
(as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpable than gross
216
negligence, [and therefore] should be proscribed.”
Before
studying the difference between these two different formulations of
good faith, it is helpful to examine certain other bedrock difficulties
with the concept.
217
Despite its well-developed status in both contract and insurance
218
law, good faith has bred confusion in corporate law in two different
ways. First, in the view of one commentator, “the meaning of good
219
Far from being a coherent
faith in 102(b)(7) remains a mystery.”
concept that usefully provides a remedy for directorial dereliction of
duty, from this perspective good faith has been “used as a loose
rhetorical device that courts can wield to find viability or enjoin
220
actions that do not quite fit within established doctrinal categories.”
213. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 65.
216. Id.
217. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 753 n.449.
218. See generally STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY
(1977).
219. Griffith, supra note 5, at 14.
220. Id. at 34.

AND
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Second, prior to Disney V, Delaware courts and commentators
disagreed about whether good faith constituted a third, independent
221
fiduciary duty, or whether it should be understood as “a subset or
‘subsidiary’ requirement that is subsumed within the duty of loyalty,
as distinguished from being a compartmentally distinct fiduciary duty
of equal dignity with the two bedrock duties of loyalty and due
222
care.” As Chancellor Chandler put it in Disney IV, “[t]he fiduciary
duties owed by directors of a Delaware corporation are the duties of
care and loyalty. Of late, much discussion among the bench, bar, and
academics alike, has surrounded a so-called third fiduciary duty, that
223
of good faith.”
At one level, Disney V settled this latter dispute by recognizing good
faith as a fiduciary obligation qualitatively different from the duty of
224
care and the traditional interpretation of the duty of loyalty,
Nevertheless, despite its admonition that “[t]he good faith required
of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care and
225
loyalty,” the Disney V court left open the question whether the duty
it recognized could serve as an independent basis for “direct”
226
imposition of liability. The court’s subsequent opinion in Stone has
now described the duty of good faith, at least in the context of
allegations of claims of Caremark-type oversight failure, as a
227
component of the “fundamental duty of loyalty,”
While the
228
doctrinal location of the new good faith has significance, the key
point for purposes of this discussion is that there are two ways in
which good faith operates in Delaware corporate law. The first, the
obligation we refer to as the old good faith, functions generally as an
ethical evaluation of the subjective motivation frequently at issue in
traditional duty of loyalty cases. The second, the duty we call the new
good faith applies where directors consciously fail to comply with
known duties, and it can be identified through the application of

221. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
(referring to “triads’ of fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty and care”). See also sources
cited supra note 29 and infra note 236.
222. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 7, 2001), vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (2001), remanded to No. 9700, 2003 WL
21003437 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003).
223. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 745. See sources cited infra note 229.
224. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 63-66 (Del. 2006).
225. Id. (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755).
226. Id. at 67, n.112
227. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
228. Id.; Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 n.109
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objective criteria. Doctrinal confusion arises because the term “good
229
faith” functions differently in the two contexts.
2.

The old good faith: good faith as the opposite of subjective bad faith
Before turning to the claim before it, the Disney V court first
discussed the category of conduct “involv[ing] so-called ‘subjective
bad faith,’ that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to
230
This conduct, the court explained, “constitutes classic,
do harm.”
231
quintessential bad faith. . . .” in that it entails “‘the conscious doing
of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . a
state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill
232
will.’” The Disney V court included within this category instances in
which a fiduciary prefers his or her own interests, or the interests of
related persons, over the best interests of the corporation, terming
233
this conduct as “disloyalty in the classic sense.”
The opposite of such improperly motivated conduct is good faith,
but it is the old good faith. There are two critical characteristics of
229. Even within a single legal discipline, sometimes the same term may have
different meanings. For example, in constitutional law, due process means
something quite different when it is substantive rather than procedural. The starting
place for an analysis of the Delaware courts’ recent iterations of corporate directors’
duty to act in good faith is Hillary Sale’s 2004 article. See Sale, supra note 18. After a
meticulous examination of the cases, Professor Sale argues that good faith constitutes
a third, independent fiduciary duty. Id. In a very recent article, Professor Eisenberg
likewise concludes that good faith constitutes a fiduciary duty distinct from the duties
of care and loyalty. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 74-75.
For other discussions of good faith predating Disney V, see Griffith, supra note 6, at 6
(suggesting that good faith functions less as a substantive standard and more as a
rhetorical device used to increase judicial review of corporate board decisions);
Robert Baker, In Re Walt Disney: What it Means to the Definition of Good Faith,
Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 261
(2004-2005) (arguing that Disney II aligns the duty of good faith with the traditional
duty of care, thereby diminishing the usefulness of exculpatory provisions); Matthew
R. Berry, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal Liability?
Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004) (noting that
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporate Code protects directors from personal
liability for gross negligence and reckless behavior); Jaclyn J. Janssen, Note, In re
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too Much
Faith in the Duty of Good Faith, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1573; Tara L. Dunn, The Developing
Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate
Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531 (2005)
(chronicling the Delaware courts’ progression toward imposing personal liability on
directors through the duty of good faith); John L. Reed & Matt Niederman, “Good
Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporate Law
as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004) (analyzing the meaning of “not in good
faith” with regard to Delaware’s exculpation statute).
230. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64.
231. Id.
232. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64 n.102 (quoting McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012,
1036 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
233. Id. at 65. See infra note 239.
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the old good faith. First, good faith in this sense is most typically
understood in terms of its opposite, subjective bad faith. As the court
noted in Disney IV, “at least in the corporate fiduciary context, it is
234
probably easier to define bad faith rather than good faith.”
This
understanding echoes Professor Summers’ venerable observation in
the context of contract law that good faith is “a phrase which has no
general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude
235
many heterogeneous forms of bad faith.”
Second, as the Disney V
court’s language makes clear, the terms good faith and bad faith in
this sense function as a description of an actor’s motivations, rather
than an objective account of his or her actions. Their character,
236
therefore, is “subjective.” Thus, the old good faith was not at issue
in Disney V with respect to the conduct of the outside directors.
The old good faith is a concept fundamentally defined by the
negation of its negation—that is, good faith is an absence of
subjective bad faith. A director, therefore, is said to act in good faith,
in this sense, if his or her motivations are neither dishonest, deceptive
nor otherwise improper. Because the old good faith is principally a
concept related to motivation, it is not surprising that good faith “is
237
not a well-developed area of our corporate fiduciary law.” The old
238
good faith has not bred “a carefully delineated mode of analysis,”
239
because it has not had to do so.
The new articulation of good faith that began to attract attention
following Caremark is quite different. Far from commanding an
absence of improper motivation, it should be understood to require
positive conduct measured by objective criteria. In Disney V, the
Delaware Supreme Court, like the Chancery Court decision it
upheld, defined this concept in terms of bad faith. Nevertheless, the
234. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 753.
235. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968). The court then
contrasts this state of affairs with the abundance of jurisprudence regarding good
faith in contractual contexts. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 754 n.449. The inapplicability
of bad faith to the duty at issue in the Disney trial is discussed infra Part III.
236. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64. In Desert Equities v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity
Fund, II, LP, 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993), the court quoted Black’s Law
Dictionary (5th ed. 1983) to define bad faith as “not simply bad judgment or
negligence, but rather [as] impl[ying] the conscious doing of a wrong because of
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. . . . ”
237. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63.
238. Griffith, supra note 5, at 7.
239. Bad faith motivation in corporate law generally has been discussed in
connection with cases alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. While the
word “loyalty” carries a broad range of positive normative connotations in ordinary
speech, in the law of corporate governance it generally has played a more narrowlyfocused role. See generally Loyalty Discourse, supra note 164.
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required showing of bad faith conduct associated with the new good
faith encompasses a failure to act in accordance with known
directorial duties rather than the presence of subjectively bad
motives. In a passage in Disney V reiterated in Stone, the court also left
open the possibility that “[t]here may be other examples of bad faith
yet to be proved or alleged” in connection with the new formulation
240
of good faith.
How the doctrine will unfold in the courts is
impossible to predict, but it seems possible that corporate law is on
the threshold of the development of a new doctrine that could have a
real cutting edge in terms of what officers and directors must do to
avoid liability. The following sections discuss the role of the good
faith standard in the Disney litigation.
3.

The Disney opinions—the core of the new good faith
a.

Disney II—allegations that state a good faith claim
241

Disney II took an important step beyond McCall in establishing the
existence of a positive new good faith duty, and not just because it
was the decision of a Delaware court. The Court of Chancery held
that allegations of directors’ sustained inattention to duty—i.e.,
“knowing or intentional lack of due care . . . suggest[ing] that the
Disney directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed
to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to
Disney and its stockholders—were sufficient to permit the plaintiffs’
242
action to go forward.
Procedurally, the Disney matter came before the Chancellor on the
defendant directors’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint that
the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiffs to file in its decision in
243
Brehm v. Eisner.
Initially, the plaintiffs had pled their case on the
244
The
basis of alleged breaches of the duties of loyalty and care.
Brehm court dismissed the duty of loyalty claims after finding that the
pertinent allegations were “not supported by well-pleaded facts” and
240. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *5 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (citing
Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
241. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
242. Id. at 278.
243. 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000).
244. “[I]t appears from the [initial] Complaint that: (a) the compensation and
termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious, compared
to Ovitz’ value to the Company; and (b) the processes of the boards of directors in
dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment Agreement were
casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249. As such, “[t]his is a
case about whether there should be personal liability of the directors of a Delaware
corporation to the corporation for lack of due care in the decision-making process
and for [the] waste of corporate assets.” Id. at 255.
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“were illogical and counterintuitive.” The court also dismissed the
plaintiffs’ duty of care claims. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme
Court instructed the Chancellor to provide the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to file an amended complaint repleading their
246
allegations pertaining to conscious disregard of duty. It was in the
plaintiffs’ interest to characterize the defendant directors’ behavior
in terms of failures to act in good faith, thereby bringing their
conduct outside the protective shield of the section 102(b)(7)
exculpatory provision included in the company’s certificate of
incorporation. The result, in the apt words of former Delaware Chief
Justice Veasey, was that a due care action “morphed into a ‘good
247
faith’ case.
In refusing to dismiss the amended complaint in Disney II,
Chancellor Chandler described the new complaint as charging the
248
directors with an “ostrich-like” approach. The Chancellor read the
amended complaint to claim that the defendants “consciously and
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care
249
about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”
Emphasizing that the plaintiffs alleged that the “directors knew that
they were making material decisions without adequate information
and without adequate deliberation,” the court held that such
allegations sufficed to state a claim for a “breach of the directors’
obligation to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best
250
interests . . . .”
The directors were neither shielded from
substantive liability by the business judgment rule nor entitled to the
251
protection of section 102(b)(7). Accordingly, the Chancellor ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs when the defendants moved to dismiss the
252
amended complaint. The Chancellor’s decision calls to mind Judge
253
Hand’s famous words: “[Directors] have an individual duty to keep
themselves informed in some detail” about the affairs of the
corporation, instead of allowing themselves “to be carried along
254
as . . . figurehead[s].”

245. See id. at 257; Disney I, 731 A.2d at 355-56.
246. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267.
247. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1441. “Curiously,” as Chief Justice
Veasey notes, “potential exoneration of directors under section 102(b)(7) was not
discussed in that phase of the case.” Id. at 1440 n.155.
248. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 288 (Del. Ch. 2003).
249. Id. at 289.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 289-90.
252. Id.
253. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
254. Id. at 615.
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b. Disney IV—plaintiffs’ failure to prove the directors’ conscious
disregard of duty
The lengthy trial of the claims against the Disney directors was
probably the most celebrated, and widely-reported, corporate
governance trial in American history—at least since the Dodge boys
255
challenged Henry Ford in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company nearly a
century ago. Disney IV is the painstaking analysis supporting the
Chancellor’s decision in favor of the defendants. Given the context,
most of the opinion details “who did what” in the hiring and firing of
Michael Ovitz.
What matters for purposes of the long run
development of doctrine is the standard of conduct to which the
court held the outside directors. The question the court decided was
whether the quantity and quality of the outside directors’ actions
sufficed to constitute good faith performance of their duties. The
facts did not present a question of the ethical assessment of the
directors’ motivations, connoted by the traditional use of the
expression “bad faith.” Rather, the court described the standard
under which it was assessing the conduct of the various defendant
directors as follows: “Upon long and careful consideration, I am of
the opinion that the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the
only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in
256
good faith.”
While evaluation of the court’s decision on the merits of the case is
beyond the scope of this Article, Chancellor Chandler’s discussion of
why two Disney directors, actor Sidney Poitier and publisher and
former U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Monica Lozano, were not
liable is illustrative. There was no dispute that both became involved
257
in the matter late in the process of hiring Ovitz. The court assessed
their liability by comparing their actions to those of the Trans Union

255. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
256. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005). The court then described such
a dereliction of duty as conduct “disloyal to the corporation.” Id. Chancellor
Chandler, however, cited Van Gorkom in a footnote appended to the discussion. Id. at
n.460 (citing 488 A.2d 873). Although Van Gorkom focused on the duty of care, see
488 A.2d at 872-73 (“a director’s duty to exercise informed business judgment is in
the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”), the
Chancellor’s point was to hone in on the somewhat elusive aspects of fiduciary duty
that he characterized as beyond the narrow parameters of either care or loyalty. Id.
at 755 & n.460. At a later point in the opinion, the Chancellor also cited an article
by Lyman Johnson suggesting that the duty of loyalty has the capacity to command a
higher degree of faithfulness than generally required of corporate directors under
prevailing legal standards. Id. at 761, n.487. See infra note 262.
257. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 766.
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258

directors in Van Gorkom.
The question the court was deciding, in
other words, was whether Poitier and Lozano had fulfilled their
affirmative duties as directors. The court concluded that they were
not liable because they “did not intentionally disregard a duty to act,
nor did they bury their heads in the sand knowing a decision had to
259
be made.”
c.

Disney V—confirmation of the new good faith

Disney V marks not only the last word in this protracted litigation,
but also the seminal word in the development of the new good faith.
Given the procedural posture, the Chancellor’s lengthy opinion, and
its decision to affirm, the Delaware Supreme Court could have
avoided providing much insight on the meaning of good faith.
Fortunately, in Disney V the court had the wisdom to provide
guidance to the bar, and to the corporate world by shining a light on
260
a duty “shrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence.”
Stone
clarifies the Disney standard, but it does not change its essential
character.
In its decision, the Disney V court confirmed that corporate
directors can be held accountable when they consciously disregard
their responsibilities. The court stated that “the universe of fiduciary
misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e.,
preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or a related person
261
to the interest of the corporation) or gross negligence.”
The
“vehicle . . . needed to address [conscious disregard of directorial
262
In working
duty] doctrinally . . . is the duty to act in good faith.”
out the scope of the duty, the decision identified the difference
between the old good faith and the new good faith. In so doing, it
recognized the difference between what it called “‘subjective bad
faith,’ that is, fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do
263
harm,” and the “good faith . . . [of] all actions required by a true
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of a corporation and its
264
shareholders.
258. Id. at 767-70.
259. Id. at 771.
260. Id. at 754 (quoted in Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63 n.98).
261. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 64.
264. Id. at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755). For discussion of the court’s
three-fold analysis on this point, see text accompanying notes 214-215, supra. The
court also interpreted the use of good faith in the indemnification statute, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001)—the only other use of the phrase in the General
Corporation Law—consistently with the distinction between negligent or grossly
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The “new” good faith applies in cases “where corporate directors
have no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in
misconduct that is more culpable than simple inattention or failure
265
to be informed of all facts material to the decision.”
The is true
regardless of the directors’ motives. The Supreme Court quoted
Chancellor Chandler in defining the duty:
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not
simply the duties of care and loyalty . . . discussed . . . above, but all
action required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. A failure to act in good
faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally
acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests
of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to
violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating
266
conscious disregard for his duties.

Significantly, like Chancellor Chandler, the Delaware Supreme
Court made it clear that this was an open-ended list. It noted:
“There may be other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or
267
alleged, but these three are the most salient.”
The invitation to
further doctrinal development is plain and entirely salutary. It
reflects the tradition developed in the corporate jurisprudence of
Delaware and many other states of establishing a general approach to
268
doctrine to be developed in subsequent case-by-case adjudication.
In a matter of months, the high court availed itself of its own
invitation.

negligent violation of the duty of care and conduct that is not in good faith:
“[u]nder Delaware statutory law a director or officer may be indemnified for liability
(and litigation expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but
not for a violation of the duty to act in good faith.” Id. at 66.
265. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66.
266. Id. at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755). Interestingly, although the
court does not cite the language, this passage echoes the observation in Van Gorkom
that a director’s “obligation does not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing. But
fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad
faith or fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a
director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical
eye in assessing information. . . .” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985).
267. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 756).
268. See, e.g., Corporate Universe, supra note 2, at 168-73 (asserting that corporate
jurisprudence evolves as a “function of the development of the common law
reflecting changing business morés and sharper pleading in corporate litigation”).
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d. The Stone clarification
In November 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court handed down
269
its decision in Stone v. Ritter.
Stone involved a shareholders’
derivative action against present and former directors of the
AmSouth Bancorporation. The plaintiffs filed a Caremark action
alleging that AmSouth’s directors breached their duty to act in good
faith by failing to put in place monitoring systems adequate to enable
them to learn of illegal conduct on the part of branch bank
employees that ultimately required the corporation to pay fines and
270
penalties of $50 million.
Finding that the plaintiffs had conceded
the absence of any basis for concluding that the directors knew or
should have known of the misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the Chancellor’s dismissal of the complaint “for failure to
excuse demand by alleging particularized facts that created reason to
doubt whether the directors had acted in good faith in exercising
271
their oversight responsibilities.”
In reaching its decision, the court noted that “the Caremark
standard for so-called ‘oversight’ liability draws heavily upon the
concept of director failure to act in good faith . . . consistent with the
definition(s) of bad faith recently approved by this court in its recent
272
Disney decision.”
After holding that the Chancery Court had
utilized the proper standard in evaluating the plaintiffs’ complaint
against the AmSouth directors, the high court proceeded to clarify
the operation of good faith in Caremark oversight actions. Noting the
Disney V court’s reservation of the specific question whether good
faith is an independent duty, the court explained that “a failure to act
in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct
imposition of fiduciary liability . . . [but] ‘is a subsidiary element[,]
273
i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”
The court
continued: “It follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in
the sense described in Disney [V] and Caremark, is essential to
establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that
274
conduct is the duty of loyalty.”
The court derived two doctrinal consequences from its analysis.
“First, although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a
269. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
270. Id. at *1.
271. Id. at *9. The court admonished that “good faith exercise of oversight
responsibility may not invariably prevent employees from violating criminal laws, or
from causing the corporation to incur significant financial liability, or both. . . .” Id.
272. Id. at *5 (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d 27).
273. Id. at *6. (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 & n.112).
274. Id.
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triad of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty,” it
is not “an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing
275
as the duties of care and loyalty.” Second, however, the court
emphasized that the fiduciary duty of loyalty “is not limited to cases
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest;
it also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good
276
faith.” The court explicitly admonished that “[w]here directors fail
to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty
of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
277
faith.”
The outcome in Stone is consistent with this analysis. There was
nothing to support a sustained oversight failure or conscious
disregard of duty on the part of AmSouth’s directors. In fact, they
had implemented significant compliance and monitoring
procedures. As the court noted, the plaintiffs appeared to rest their
claims on the failure of the monitoring system to prevent the illegal
conduct rather than on directorial inattention, let alone conscious
278
disregard, of this important responsibility.
A potential problem with Stone is that, like the Disney V opinion it
clarifies, it poses a risk that in requiring bad faith conduct to take
directorial misconduct beyond the reach of section 102(b)(7)
exculpatory provisions, it will be read, or misread, to require more
than the absence of good faith specified by the statute—i.e., bad faith
279
understood as subjectively bad motivation.

275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67).
278. Id. at *9.
279. The court’s characterization of the “traditional” duty of loyalty in Stone and
Disney V does not mitigate this problem, nor does its apparent association of bad faith
as a necessary element in loyalty cases. See id. at *6. Duty of loyalty cases most often
concern some form of deliberate self-dealing or other type of self-aggrandizement,
but even traditional duty of loyalty actions do not always turn on a showing of
subjectively improper motivation. Courts frequently find the operative disloyalty in
the objective, self-aggrandizing conduct of the defendant, rather than in the “bad
faith” motivation that may have prompted it. Indeed, the action of a director or
officer could be entirely motivated by subjective good faith and yet objectively
constitute self-dealing, for which the court would impose liability. As Professor
Eisenberg notes, “[i]t is not enough . . . that a manager acts honestly in the sense
that he acts sincerely. Many persons adopt belief systems that allow them to sincerely
conclude that that morally outrageous conduct is proper.” Eisenberg, supra note 5, at
22; see also O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1238 (explaining the potential impact of
group pressures on directorial decision-making). As the testimony of a number of
the key defendants in the mega-scandals of the first years of this century shows (if we
believe they were testifying honestly), the capacity of human beings to deceive
themselves about their motivations where their acts objectively benefit themselves is
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Consequently, it is important for the Delaware courts to make the
requirements of the new good faith standard clear, especially because
in both Disney V and Stone, the high court upheld decisions in favor
of corporate directors. The following discussion suggests that
clarification of the applicable good faith/bad faith calculus could
have a major effect on the long term impact of the standard.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLARIFYING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
PRESENCE OF SUBJECTIVE BAD FAITH AND THE ABSENCE OF GOOD
FAITH
A. Did Mrs. Pritchard Act in Bad Faith?—A Question of
Apples and Oranges
For the purpose of restoring trust in corporate governance, the
new good faith is full of promise. Few would quarrel with the goal of
instilling “true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the
280
corporation and its shareholders.” However, if the new good faith
is to be significant, it must offer more than rhetoric and encompass
tasks neither rendered irrelevant by section 102(b)(7) exculpatory
provisions nor already addressed by the classic duty of loyalty.
A good way to demonstrate the difference between the absence of
good faith—failing to act where one has a fiduciary duty to act—and
the traditional understanding of bad faith—acting with improper
motivation—is to return to the Widow Pritchard and Francis v. United
281
Jersey Bank.
To understand why it is risky to define the absence of
good faith in terms of bad faith, suppose that Francis were to arise
today under Delaware law, and that the corporation had availed itself
of the opportunity to include the kind of exculpatory provision
authorized by section 102(b)(7) in its certificate of incorporation. If
the duty to act where one has a known duty to act were breached only
by bad faith in the sense of subjectively improper motivation, then
the Widow Pritchard undoubtedly would escape liability. There was
no evidence that she intended to harm the corporation, or that she
preferred another’s interests to those of the entity she undertook to
serve. Nevertheless, her inaction is a paradigm of conscious
disregard of directorial duties.
Francis held Mrs. Pritchard personally liable for paying so little
attention to corporate affairs that her feckless sons were able to
huge. Fiduciaries also may act disloyally for other than pecuniary reasons, see
Hintmann, supra note 10, at 580.
280. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
281. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
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misappropriate virtually all of the funds the company held in trust for
282
its insureds. Under Van Gorkom’s gross negligence standard, in the
absence of the kind of exculpatory provision authorized by section
102(b)(7), Mrs. Pritchard would surely be liable for breach of the
duty of care because of her radical inattention to her directorial
responsibilities. The business judgment rule would not help her,
283
because that rule requires at least some directorial action. If, on the
other hand, the corporation had taken advantage of the right to
exculpate directors to the extent permitted by section 102(b)(7), the
provision arguably would immunize Mrs. Pritchard from liability for
her clear violation of the duty of care. The only way around the
284
But, as
provision would be to invoke the statute’s exceptions.
described above, good faith in its traditional formulation—i.e., the
absence of subjective bad faith motivation—would not help. Thus,
equating dereliction of duty with acting on the basis of subjectively
improper motivation is like mixing apples and oranges.
One cannot help but feel empathy for Mrs. Pritchard. Her
inaction merits criticism, but it is not the type of criticism that would
be directed at her sons who, to enrich themselves personally, stole
285
from the corporation and its clients. Nothing in the case suggests
that her inaction was in any respect malicious or otherwise motivated
286
in an ethically improper way.
Mrs. Pritchard surely did not act in
bad faith; her sons did. Yet, it should be clear that Mrs. Pritchard
breached the good faith standard articulated in Disney V. This
standard imposes liability “where the fiduciary intentionally fails to
act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
282. Id. at 819-20, 829 (noting that Mrs. Pritchard’s husband had even warned that
one of their sons would “take the shirt off [his] back”); see supra text accompanying
note 118.
283. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (stating that,
because it “operates only in the context of director action,” the business judgment
rule is inapplicable “where directors have[,] . . . absent a conscious decision, failed to
act.”); see also American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) cmt. C (American Law Institute
Publishers, 1994).
284. Three of the exceptions set forth in section 102(b)(7) plainly are
inapplicable to a claim against Mrs. Pritchard. There is no self-dealing that would
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty (subsection (i)), no suggestion that Mrs.
Pritchard could be charged with the corporation’s unlawful acquisition of stock or
payment of dividends (subsection (iii)), and no allegation that she derived improper
benefit from a transaction (subsection (iv)).
285. See Francis, 432 A.2d at 818 (“Starting in 1970, . . . Charles, Jr. and William
begin [sic] to siphon ever-increasing sums from the corporation under the guise of
loans.”).
286. See id. at 819 (noting both that Mrs. Pritchard was unfamiliar with the
rudiments of the business and that she became incapacitated after her husband’s
death).
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disregard for his duties.”
Mrs. Pritchard’s subjective motivation,
from an ethical point of view, is quite irrelevant. Her inattention to
her responsibilities breached her duty of good faith, not because she
acted in bad faith, but because she failed to act in good faith. The
motivation-laden language of bad faith used in Disney V and Stone
288
threatens to obscure this important distinction.
B. A Different Kind of Bad Faith
This consideration of Francis illustrates the confusion that may arise
if the Delaware courts fail to make the distinction between the
absence of good faith and the presence of bad faith crystal clear. In
Disney V, Delaware’s high court left the door open to additional
examples of bad faith that may lead to further development of the
289
good faith duty, but optimal doctrinal development will occur only
if the courts avoid the trap of conflating the absence of good faith—
i.e., conscious disregard of directorial responsibilities—with the
presence of bad faith in the form of improper subjective motivation.
In light of the language of Disney V, whenever a lawsuit alleges a
conscious disregard of duty by a defendant director, the defense
undoubtedly will argue that the challenged conduct bears none of
the hallmarks traditionally associated with bad faith. However, as the
Delaware Supreme Court first pointed out in Van Gorkom and
reiterated in Disney V, “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires
290
more than the mere absence of [traditional] bad faith or fraud.”
Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court has defined the duty of
good faith in the context of failure to attend to directorial duties as
“bad faith,” expanding the meaning of “bad faith” beyond its
traditional connotation as an ethical assessment of motivation. The
court did not need to take this tack. Good faith, shorn of
connotations of improper motivation, could have done the job by
287. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
288. Compare Francis, 432 A.2d 814, with Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
As discussed supra Part I.B.1, Joy v. North involved director quiescence in the face of
loans potentially risking ten percent of shareholders’ equity. Joy, 692 F.2d at 895.
Applying Connecticut law, in an era before the passage of statutes such as section
102(b)(7), the Second Circuit held that directors could be liable for violating the
duty of care, saying, “[d]irectors who willingly allow others to make major decisions
affecting the future of the corporation wholly without supervision or oversight may
not defend on their lack of knowledge, for that ignorance itself is a breach of
fiduciary duty.” Id. at 896. The outside directors were inattentive to their duties.
They did not act in bad faith. Under the new good faith, they could be held liable, as
could Mrs. Pritchard, without proof that they possessed an improper motive.
289. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (concluding it was “unwise” to curtail development of
fiduciary duty by offering a categorical definition).
290. 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).

DUGGINGOLDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

1/9/2007 1:11:44 PM

RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE DIRECTORS

255

requiring plaintiffs to plead an absence of good faith with
appropriate specificity in conjunction with the standard procedural
requirements for shareholder derivative actions pursuant to Delaware
291
corporate law. It is riskier to redefine “bad faith.” The term is so
laden with the accumulated baggage of improper motivation that
efforts to hold directors liable for serious inattention to duty in the
absence of improper motive could be thwarted. Nor was it necessary
to define good faith in this manner to fashion a loyalty exception to
section 102(b)(7). Subsection (i) of the statute forbids exculpation
292
of acts or omissions that violate the duty of loyalty.
Whatever course the courts follow, it is essential to recognize the
substantive difference between a conscious failure to act and
improperly motivated action. Ultimately, “the good faith iteration’s
utility may rest in its [capacity to serve as a] constant reminder . . .
that, regardless of his motive, a director who consciously disregards his
duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal
293
judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.” Bearing
in mind this caveat, properly applied the Disney standard offers real
potential as a means of helping to restore trust in corporate directors
to do their jobs.
IV. THE NEW GOOD FAITH AS AN ANTIDOTE FOR THE CORPORATE
TRUST CRISIS
The value of any legal standard depends on its effectiveness in
promoting societal objectives. While the ultimate impact of legal
rules turns on the interplay of a variety of factors, including cultural
morés, social expectations, and enforcement capability, there are
294
many different routes to accomplishing societal goals through law.
291. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (discussing Delaware pleading requirements).
292. See supra text accompanying note 154.
293. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoted in Disney V, 906
A.2d at 67 n.111) (emphasis added).
294. As Lisa Fairfax points out, “some scholars argue that legal sanctions may be
neither necessary (because of extra-legal factors [e.g., management pressures and
fear of reputational damage] that shape director conduct) nor effective in
constraining director behavior.” Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 427. Others,
particularly contractarians, oppose legal strictures on directorial conduct because of
the transaction costs these kinds of laws generate. As Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout
observe, however, neither the market nor the law alone does a particularly effective
job of keeping directors faithful to their fiduciary responsibilities. See Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737-38 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Blair and Stout]. Both
Professor Fairfax and Professors Blair and Stout offer analyses of the operation of
legal and extra-legal forces. Professor Fairfax emphasizes her disagreement with
those who eschew directorial liability and focuses on the need for sanctions to hold
directors accountable for adherence to fiduciary duties. See Spare the Rod, supra note
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In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress chose to address the need to restore
trust in the corporate sector by enacting prescriptive measures that
focus principally on constraining the behavior of critical actors.
Delaware’s new good faith embodies a complementary but quite
different approach. To the extent the courts prove willing to enforce
it, the Disney standard promises to promote general trustworthiness
instead of requiring actors to act, or refrain from acting, in specified
ways. After a brief look at trust in the corporate fiduciary context, the
following discussion focuses on the potential effectiveness of the new
good faith as a vehicle to promote trust in corporate directors by
encouraging trustworthy conduct.
A. The Nature of Trust in the Context of Corporate Fiduciary Relationships
Trust is a critical aspect of life. The very act of living requires a
basic level of faith in our ability to perceive the physical world and to
understand both intellectual concepts and the complex interactions
296
that comprise our social environment.
Trust is integral to social
297
well-being, and it is “at the root of any economic system based on
298
Without some level of trust in
mutually beneficial exchange.”
20, at 395. Professors Blair and Stout focus on the operation of trust within the firm.
See Blair & Stout, supra.
295. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (Supp. 2003).
296. Consequently, as Mark Hall points out, “[w]hether trust is regarded as an end
in itself, or as a means to some other end, trust is too important and pervasive for the
law to neglect in any realm.” Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV.
463, 525 (2002). Professor Hall draws on the metaphor of trust as a kind of social
adhesive. See id. at 464. In a similar vein, in the corporate arena, Lawrence Mitchell
describes trust as “the glue that binds corporate relationships,” suggesting that:
No matter how strong the legal rules requiring fiduciary loyalty are, no matter how
successfully the market aligns a fiduciary’s self-interest with corporate interest, trust is
essential for corporate survival. In the absence of some measure of trust between
those who invest their money and those who manage it, the corporation cannot
succeed as an efficient business entity.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 425
(1993) [hereinafter Fairness and Trust]; see also, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic
Rationality and the Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993); Russell
Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS 26, 41-42 (1996); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591 (2001) [hereinafter Importance of Being
Trusted].
297. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 7-8 (1995), referenced by Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and Lessons from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2002)
[hereinafter Lessons]; see also, e.g., Perspective, supra note 20, at 16 (“The corporate
governance system depends on trust in people—especially the directors, regulators
and courts.”). From a marketing perspective, trust sells products. Consequently, for
decades companies have spent a great deal of money to advertise slogans such as
“you can trust your car to the man who wears the star,” or that theirs is “a name you
can trust.”
298. Alan Greenspan’s commencement address given at Harvard University in
June of 1999 (quoted in FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting COLLEGE

DUGGINGOLDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

1/9/2007 1:11:44 PM

RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE DIRECTORS

257

corporations and those who manage their affairs, hiding money
under the mattress would be more attractive than investing in stocks
and bonds. While legal scholars and social scientists debate the
extent to which legal sanctions, market signals, and other factors
299
generate trust, both proponents of an economic understanding of
law and those who challenge the validity of the homo economicus model
agree that trust is valuable—as a means of increasing efficiency by
300
301
reducing transaction costs and/or as a social good in and of itself.
As Professors Blair and Stout observe, “[t]he essence of a fiduciary
relationship is the legal expectation that the fiduciary will adopt the
other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark of
302
trustworthy behavior.”
Corporate directors have a direct fiduciary
relationship with the entities they serve and an indirect fiduciary
relationship with the shareholders. Shareholders entrust control of
their property to directors who are charged with overall management
303
of the corporation. They expect those who manage the companies

ADMINISTRATION PUBLICATIONS, ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS: A MESSAGE FROM ALAN
GREENSPAN, CAP ELECTRONIC BULL. (Oct. 19, 1999), available at http://www.
collegepubs.com/elecbulletin.shtml#EB99.4)); see also FRANKEl, supra note 10, at 49.
(“Trust has a crucial role in promoting prosperity.”).
299. For a discussion of the role of legal and market sanctions, social and
economic context, and internalized learning in promoting trust within the firm, see
Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1747-53.
300. See, e.g., NICHOLAS LUHMAN, TRUST AND POWER 79, 93-94 (1979); Jay B. Barney
& Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 175 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos,
Meinhard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137, 146
(1999) (“Broad fiduciary obligations facilitate the financing of ventures, mitigate the
effects of managers’ risk-aversion, align the financing decisions of investors with the
true economic desirability of projects, and align the incentives of managers with the
benefit to the economy and the desire of investors”); Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81
B.U. L. REV. 553, 555 (2001) (Trust “refers to the willingness to make oneself
vulnerable to another without costly external constraints. Trust is socially valuable,
and thus society should encourage it.”).
301. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 206 (“The one thing on which we need
not compromise is the ambition to become an honest society and to have our society
reap the rich rewards of honesty.”).
302. Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1743.
303. Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 430, citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684-87 (1990)
(“[T]he power holder has complete freedom to conduct that segment of the
dependent’s life over which she has been given responsibility.”) (citation omitted);
see also, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 300, at 556 (“Trust can be seen simply as a decision
by one person to give power over his person or property to another in exchange for a
return promise.”). Mitchell notes that in the corporate context, “[t]he power and
control that are present in all fiduciary relationships are exaggerated . . . because the
indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practically infinite array of
investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility of specified
limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders unrealistic.”
Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 430.
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they invest in to produce value, and they anticipate a share in the
benefit derived from their capital. Shareholders are entitled to
directors who act in a trustworthy fashion.
Today, more Americans own stock than at any other time in
history. The number of shareholders has grown exponentially over
the last several decades, increasing from one percent of the
population in 1900 to thirteen percent in 1980, to more than fifty
304
percent by the turn of the twenty-first century. Large corporations
305
employ tens of millions of workers, and a number of major
corporations wield more global economic power than many of the
306
world’s countries. Americans therefore have a compelling interest
in the trustworthiness of those who manage major corporations. One
of the most important purposes of corporate fiduciary law is to
encourage directors to merit this trust, for the benefit of the public
generally and shareholders in particular.
While trust is critical in the corporate fiduciary context, as
Professor Mitchell has observed, this recognition “does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the result of that trust will in
some sense be the ‘true’ or ‘right’ result or the result that one would
have chosen for herself. In other words, one can be mistaken yet
307
trustworthy.” The notion that it is better to allow directors to make
mistakes than to curtail entrepreneurial freedom is the operative
principle of the business judgment rule, and it is consistent with the
308
emergence of the new good faith.
The Disney standard does not
require directors to act correctly; in keeping with the exclusion set
304. See CAPLOW ET AL., supra note 9. As David Skeel observes, “for the first time in
history, the stock market is the investment of choice of many Americans’ ordinary,
‘safe’ savings, not just their savings at risk.” DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:
THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 212
(2005).
305. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 382.
306. For example, in a 2002 comparison of countries’ national gross domestic
products with the sales of major corporations Wal-Mart placed nineteenth—between
Belgium and Sweden, General Motors followed Poland in twenty-forth place, and
Exxon Mobil was in twenty-sixth place—between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Sales
figures for many other large corporations exceeded the GDP of most of the world’s
countries. SARAH ANDERSON, THEA LEE AND JOHN CAVANAUGH, FIELD GUIDE TO THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005). More recent data is available by comparing statistics
compiled by Forbes and by the World Bank. See Special Report: The Forbes Global
2000, available at http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/30/05f2000land.html; World
Bank Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation at 294
(table 4. Economic Activity), available at http://www-wds.worldbank. org.
307. Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 433. This is parallel to the philosophical
insight that a decision may be rational but ultimately wrong.
308. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1436 (“[T]hese evolving
expectations may be largely aspirational standards of conduct.”); see also, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 62; Harvey L. Pitt, The Changing Standards by which Directors
Will Be Judged, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2005).
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forth in section 102(b)(7)(ii), the new good faith standard prohibits
conscious disregard of directorial responsibilities, particularly a
309
It does not limit
failure to act in the face of a known duty to act.
the protection the business judgment rule affords to directors and
the decisions they make. Nor does it put directors at risk for acting
negligently, or even grossly negligently, so long as they actually fulfill
their duty to act when they are required to do so. The thrust of the
Disney standard is much more modest, but it is nevertheless
important. A brief review of what many have called the corporate
governance crisis—particularly the aspects we refer to as the corporate
trust crisis—helps explain why.
B. The Corporate Trust Crisis
The 1990s began with a mild recession. During the remainder of
the decade, however, the Dow Jones average and NASDAQ index
310
climbed to previously unprecedented levels.
This was a period
when many people leapt at the chance to become members of the
boards of major corporations. Corporate directorships offered
significant compensation along with enviable prestige and attractive
311
perquisites. During the same time, however, the number of federal
criminal prosecutions and associated civil proceedings against
312
corporations and corporate managers steadily increased.
Unfortunately, with a few notable exceptions such as the high-profile
prosecutions of Caremark and Columbia/HCA and the associated
313
shareholders’ derivative actions,
these developments received
relatively little attention.
They did not deter investors from
continuing to put their money into corporate securities. Nor did they
309. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. June 8, 2006).
310. The Dow Jones average peaked in January 2000, and the Nasdaq reached its
record closing high in March 2003. Jonathan Fuerbringer, The Markets: Market Place;
Stocks Surge, Bonds Fall, and Some See a New Bull Run, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at C1.
“The decade of the 90s . . . represented the halcyon days of the boom.” E. Norman
Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 56 SMU L. REV.
2135, 2135 (2003).
311. See Abigail Aims, 2005 Trends in the Corporate Governance Practices of the 100
Largest U.S. Public Companies, 1523 PLI/Corp 233, 240 (2006) (noting that the
majority of the largest 100 U.S. companies pay directors retainers of $40,000 or more
in cash, along with meeting fees, travel reimbursement, benefits such as life and
health insurance, and free products and services); see also, e.g., Inside the Boardroom—
Board Profiles: A Seattle Times Special Report, THE SEATTLE TIMES, at E1, Oct. 5, 2003
(reporting on retainers and other perquisites provided to leading companies in the
state of Washington, such as $95,000 per year in annual fees for Weyerhauser board
members and $45,000 for Nordstrom directors).
312. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics,
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 875-77 (2003)
[hereinafter Internal Investigations].
313. See supra Part II.A.2.a. & b.
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discourage service on corporate boards to any great extent; some
noted individuals served on five or more corporate boards during the
314
same time period.
The raucous activity of the bull market drowned out voices calling
315
for reform.
The question whether corporate boards could be
trusted to oversee the operations and finances of large companies
began to garner significant national attention only after Caremark
and other leading health care providers were caught in the sweeping
federal anti-health-fraud campaigns initiated during the Clinton
316
Administration.
In combination with the advent of the
317
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines a few years earlier and a
concomitant increase in federal prosecutorial activity in the business
318
sector, the Caremark decision engendered a rapidly expanding
319
These measures
industry in corporate compliance programs.
offered hope for resolution of the kinds of monitoring problems at
issue in Caremark. As Enron’s celebrated code of ethics illustrates,
however, compliance measures are of little use without diligent
320
oversight.
314. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, When Directors Play Musical Chairs; Seats on Too
Many Boards Spell Problems for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at § 3 page 1
(reporting that in 1995 “68 directors of Fortune 100 companies sat on nine or more
corporate boards, up from 36 . . . in 1991”); Judith H. Dobrzynski, Market Place; Report
Calls for Recasting Corporate Boards, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 12, 1996, at D1 (reporting that
among 7,200 Fortune 1,000 company directors, 207 held seats on seven or more
boards and many more sat on four or five); Patricia Sabatini, WE [Westinghouse] Board
Represented Well on List of Laggards, PITTS. POST GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 1995, at B9 (noting
that one Westinghouse director served on eleven boards and discussing multiple
board memberships as a possible source of some of the problems faced by troubled
companies); Aims, supra note 311, at 239-40 (reporting on multiple board
memberships among directors of 100 largest U.S. companies). See also note 388 infra.
315. Despite the bull market of the 1990s institutional investors such as CALPERS
were calling for corporate governance reforms. See N.Y. TIMES articles, supra note
314. In fact, a number of significant reform movements began in the 1990s. See E.
Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. L. 1447
(2004).
316. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege on the Business of American Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301
(2006) [hereinafter Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege].
317. See Internal Investigations, supra note 312, at 875-77.
318. See id. at 876-77.
319. See id. at 881-84.
320. Enron had a comprehensive, beautifully drafted corporate ethics code that
provided: “[w]e are dedicated to conducting business according to all applicable
local and international laws and regulations . . . and with the highest professional
and ethical standards.” ENRON CORP., ENRON CODE OF ETHICS 5 (2000), available at
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/packageart/enron/enron.pdf. All Enron
employees were required to sign a certificate of compliance confirming that they had
read the corporate ethics code and agreed to comply with it. Id. at 3. In addition to
providing information on legal compliance, Enron’s Code of Ethics contained
inspiring language on honesty and integrity. Id. It even stated: “Ruthlessness,
callousness and arrogance don’t belong here.” Id. at 4.
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Corporate governance reform became a national priority following
the financial disasters that ravaged Enron, WorldCom, and other
corporate giants beginning in the fall of 2001. Many Americans lost
321
jobs, pensions, health care and other benefits in these debacles.
These events badly damaged confidence in the integrity of corporate
executives and undermined faith in the ability of directors to keep
322
officers honest and companies financially sound.
The Disney
litigation involved very different issues, but it similarly undermined
faith in directors as effective corporate overseers. At least in the short
run, Michael Ovitz made more money by failing to work out as
president than if he had actually done a good job for the company.
As both Chancellor Chandler and the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized, the conduct of Disney’s directors was scarcely a model of
323
best practices; it certainly did not engender trust.
The Disney plaintiffs claimed that Chairman Michael Eisner had
324
engaged in misconduct.
A number of senior executives of Enron
and other companies involved in spectacular financial debacles were
325
Outside directors, however,
charged with fraud and other crimes.
were rarely accused of dishonesty or bad faith. Their principal
shortcomings arose from an inability to discern what was happening
to the companies entrusted to their care. The shenanigans of senior
executives in combination with the oversight failures of directors
generated a crisis in corporate trust.
The corporate trust crisis has provoked many different reactions.
The most notable legislative response was, of course, Sarbanes326
Oxley, the most significant expansion of the scope of federal
securities law since the 1930s. In many respects, Sarbanes-Oxley
327
entered a realm of law previously reserved to the states. In contrast
321. See sources cited supra note 10.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. As Faith Stevelman Kahn has
observed, “[l]ike that of the Twin Towers, Enron’s collapse was sudden, devastating,
and horribly unjust in its effect.” Kahn, supra note 163, at 1584.
323. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 58-59 (Del. June 8, 2006); Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 697
(Del. Ch. 2005).
324. See supra Part II.
325. See, e.g., Year of Scandals, Shame, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at 6.
326. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 -7266 (Supp. 2003).
327. See James H. Cheek, III, The Legislative and Judicial Response to Recent Corporate
Governance Failures—Will It Be Effective—Part II?, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 311,
312 (2004); Harvey L. Pitt, The Changing Standards by Which Directors Will Be Judged, 79
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005). Many authorities describe the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation as the “federalization” of corporate law, suggesting that unless Delaware
and other states act decisively, Congress will continue to expand federal control over
corporate governance and other aspects of business regulation traditionally reserved
to the states. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443 (2003)
[hereinafter State-Federal Tension]. For discussion of the nature and impact of
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328

to Delaware’s enabling approach, Sarbanes-Oxley sets forth a
number of specific, self-executing mandates, such as verification of
financial statements by CEOs and CFOs and prohibitions on loans to
329
senior officers and directors, and it directs the SEC and other
330
federal agencies to promulgate additional rules and regulations.
Congress enacted the statute in an effort to restore confidence in
331
securities markets.
It seeks to constrain the behavior of corporate
actors by establishing positive requirements and negative
prohibitions. These kinds of constraints work well with respect to the
specific areas they address. However, they also may encourage actors
to find ways around them. Tax “loopholes” provide the classic
example. At best, this approach places reliable limits only on the
“federalization,” see Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 396-408. Some commentators
contend that Congress has gone too far into a realm traditionally reserved to the
states. Jill Fisch, for example, argues that “[t]he increasing intrusion of federal law
into how corporations go about their business threatens to sacrifice the prime
objective of corporate productivity.” Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of
Corporate Governance, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 49 (2004); see also, Florence ShuAcquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 19, 49 (2004). At least one commentator
attributes the need for Congressional action to the inaction of state officials,
specifically blaming state legislators for the fiduciary lapses that contributed to the
collapse of Enron and other problems. See Brown, supra note 160, at 317-18 (“The
scandals arose in large part out of a failure of managerial oversight. . . . Not so much
a matter of director indolence, the lack of oversight occurred in large part because
state laws did not impose meaningful obligations on the board of directors in
supervising the activities of the company.”). Former Delaware Chief Justice Norman
Veasey, however, characterizes Sarbanes-Oxley as an ill-conceived measure “cobbled
together by Congress . . . [with] little regard for collateral damage—both in terms of
principles of federalism and in terms of shrinking the universe of qualified and
willing directors.” E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture,
59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2003-2004). For a general discussion of issues pertaining to
federalism and Sarbanes-Oxley, see E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of
Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions,
Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2003). But see Andrew A. Lundgren,
Sarbanes-Oxley Then Disney: The Post-Scandal Corporate Governance Plot Thickens, 8 DEL.
L. REV. 195 (2006) (suggesting that the risk of federalization is likely to diminish as
the crises that prompted enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley recede in time).
328. See supra note 154.
329. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241; 15 U.S.C. § 78m. See generally Lyman P. Q. Johnson
& Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1149, 1209 (2004) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as a collection of “piecemeal
[mandates] on a wide variety of subjects, sometimes aiming at the board of director
level and sometimes centering on senior officers”).
330. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7233 (directing the SEC to issue regulations pertaining to
audit procedures and auditor independence); 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (instructing SEC to
issue rules pertaining to professional responsibility of attorneys practicing before the
Commission).
331. See, e.g., Adriain M. Morse, Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent
Directors Policing Public Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC’s New Rules Governing
Public Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, 675 (2004)
(quoting remarks by SEC Chairman William Donaldson and former SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt on the need to reassure investors and restore trust in the wake of
corporate scandals).
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target conduct that is spelled out in the applicable statutory
332
provisions and concomitant regulations. It does not promote trust.
Delaware’s recognition of good faith as a significant fiduciary
obligation reflects a complementary, but very different, response to
333
the corporate trust crisis.
Its promise lies not in its constraints in
targeting specific misconduct, but in its capacity to encourage
directors to take their responsibility to do their jobs as least as
seriously as they take their perquisites. Before exploring the
potential of this new fiduciary standard, however, it is useful to look
briefly at the ways in which the longstanding duties of loyalty and care
function and where they fall short as a means of promoting
trustworthy action on the part of outside directors.
C. Trust and the Fiduciary Duties Owed by Corporate Directors
The duties of loyalty and care developed in response to wellfounded doubts about the trustworthiness of corporate managers. As
discussed in Part I, for more than a century legislators and courts
have struggled with the tension between entrepreneurial freedom
334
and managerial accountability.
The classic duties of loyalty and
care impose obligations designed to ensure that corporate fiduciaries
335
merit trust. While both duties make strong exhortative demands on
directors, as a result of the operation of the business judgment rule,
enforcement of the duty of care historically has been weak, and the

332. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 300, at 555-56 (“[M]andatory rules to increase
trust, in any form, may have precisely the opposite effect. . . . In particular, regulation
gives parties a weapon that they might use opportunistically, thereby increasing the
risk of distrust.”). A clear example of this effect is found in qui tam actions.
Whatever its positive effects, the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000),
undermines trust within organizations by giving constituents an incentive to turn in
employees and colleagues for pecuniary gain. See generally Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, supra note 316.
333. As Andrew Lundgren points out in a recent article, “SOX and Disney are
both products of the post-Enron world and reactions to perceived corporate
governance failures, but they differ significantly at their core.” See Lundgren, supra
note 327, at 195.
334. See supra Part I.B. Courts also often find it difficult to define a fiduciary
relationship. See Lessons, supra note 297; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 178089 (discussing the nature of trust in fiduciary relationships); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (noting
that “[f]iduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American
law”).
335. See Lessons, supra note 297, at 1026 (“[B]y imposing special duties on
participants in special trust relationships, the law of fiduciary obligations ‘permit[s]
and encourage[s] the reposing of trust.’” (quoting Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and
Money: An Affinity-Based Model for the Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses,
2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 259, 280 (1988))).
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duty of loyalty most often comes into play only when adverse financial
336
interests arise.
1.

Trust and the duty of loyalty
Although the precise parameters vary, all states impose on
corporate directors an obligation to put the interests of the entities
they serve before their personal objectives in matters pertaining to
their directorial duties. When issues relating to breach of the duty of
loyalty arise, they almost always do so in the context of conflicting
pecuniary interests. Consequently, the jurisprudence of loyalty
337
focuses principally on prohibitions against self-dealing. While some
338
question the magnitude of the transaction costs it imposes, by
encouraging fidelity on the part of corporate directors, the duty of
loyalty fosters trust on the part of shareholders and other corporate
339
constituents.
The problem with relying too much on the classic
duty of loyalty is, as earlier discussed, that it generally involves
conflicting financial interests. Instances in which the disputed
conduct involves dereliction of duty rather than subjectively bad
motives for culpable acts or omissions does not fit so readily within
340
the duty.
2.

Trust and the duty of care
As noted in Part I, the desire to preserve entrepreneurial freedom
has sometimes proved an obstacle to ensuring greater managerial
accountability. This conflict has been particularly apparent in efforts
to define the scope of the duty of care, principally because the

336. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (discussing traditional reach of duty of loyalty); see
also supra Part I.B.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 86-92. Statutory safe harbor provisions
applicable to conflicting interest transactions seek to permit interested-director
transactions that may benefit corporations by providing for transparency and
independent review—i.e., disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest and
approval by directors who are neither interested in a proposed opportunity or
transaction nor dependent upon a director involved in it. In Delaware and other
states, directors may be excused from liability for conflicting interest transactions, as
well as other forms of self-dealing in certain situations, but only when it is clear that
the corporation has suffered no harm as a result of the fiduciary breach and that the
challenged transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). Lawrence Mitchell, however, argues
persuasively that “the fairness test in corporate law enhances fiduciaries’ power to
self-deal with the practical ability and legal right to do so. The fairness test is neither
fair nor much of a test.” Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 491.
338. See Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (asserting that the duty of loyalty comes at the high
price of specification and monitoring).
339. See id. at 425.
340.
See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (“[C]onduct of this kind does not involve
disloyalty (as traditionally defined).”). See generally supra Parts II.B and III.
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business judgment rule limits the scope of the duty as an enforceable
standard of liability. In so doing, the business judgment rule provides
corporate directors with unique protection against personal liability
for negligence, and, since the enactment of section 102(b)(7), even
gross negligence. Comparison of the application of the business
judgment rule in corporate legal disputes with the operation of the
standard of care in medical malpractice litigation provides a practical
341
example.
Medical malpractice actions most often sound in negligence. To
prevail, a plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of care and
prove that the defendant health care provider violated that
342
standard. The standard of care is usually quite specific. It serves as
a measure of what a prudent provider would do in the same or
343
similar circumstances.
Consequently, it involves both procedural
and substantive criteria. Suppose, for example, that a patient
consults a physician for treatment of a skin lesion. The applicable
standard of care would require the physician to follow certain
procedures—e.g., examine the lesion carefully and possibly biopsy it,
question the patient about its onset and any concurrent symptoms,
review the patient’s medical history and the environments in which
he lives and works, etc. If the physician follows proper procedures,
she can take some comfort that she is not only treating her patient
properly but that she is protecting herself against liability for medical
malpractice. Proper procedures alone are not enough, however.
The physician must also draw reasonable conclusions and take
344
appropriate actions in response to her findings.
If the physician
does not do so, she may be held liable for malpractice—e.g., if,
despite following proper procedures, she fails to diagnose and treat
345
malignant melanoma. The principal limitation on judicial review of

341. See also, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that while
an automobile driver would likely be held liable for a mistake in judgment that
resulted in harm to a pedestrian, a corporate officer would rarely be found liable for
a judgment error that caused injury to a corporation).
342. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 264-78 (2d ed., West Group 2000). Medical
malpractice actions, like corporate fiduciary challenges, traditionally are governed
primarily by state law. See Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 316.
343. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 342, at 264-66.
344. See id. at 264 (quoting the two-pronged standard of care set forth by Hall v.
Hillburn, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985)).
345. Lawyers are in a similar position. In Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806
(Mass. 1996), a law firm was held liable when it gave estate planning clients advice
that, although reasonable at the time, “proved to be wrong.” Liability was based on
the fact that the firm rendered its opinion with an “apparent certainty . . . at a time
when the issue was not conclusively resolved, den[ying] the plaintiffs the opportunity
to assess the risk and to elect to follow alternative estate planning options.” Id. See
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the physician’s actions is the general requirement of expert testimony
to establish the applicable standard of care. Once evidence is offered
to establish the appropriate standard, the trier of fact determines
whether the physician has committed negligence and is therefore
subject to personal liability.
In contrast, the business judgment rule operates solely at the
346
procedural level. The recognition that business people often must
make decisions on the basis of imperfect information underlies the
347
Health care providers, too, must act without optimal
rule.
information. However, the standard of care applicable in medical
malpractice actions, unlike the business judgment rule, does not
protect them from substantive judicial review of their actions. As
Professor Mitchell notes, “the business judgment rule suggests that as
long as decisions are made in [good faith, with due care, and with
regard to the best interests of the corporation], those decisions are
justified in the context of the fiduciary relationship. Put simply, they
348
are deserving of trust.”
No matter how ill-advised their actions,
directors are not legally accountable for the substance of their
decisions unless their judgment is compromised by conflicting
pecuniary interests or, at least in theory, a failure to follow
appropriate procedures in the decision-making process. Thus,
directors need not reach the “true” or “right” result to avoid liability
349
or to merit trust; they can be “mistaken yet trustworthy.”
As the historical discussion in Part I notes, courts originally
adopted the business judgment rule because it fit well with the
objectives of investors and their willingness to accept risk as a quid
350
pro quo for the promise of significant returns on their investments.
Section 102(b)(7), however, created a shield that went far beyond the
protection afforded by the business judgment rule. In permitting
corporations to exempt directors from personal liability for all
instances of negligence and gross negligence, section 102(b)(7)
appeared to excuse even the kinds of malfeasance at issue in Francis
351
and Joy. While it may not have altered social norms overnight, this

generally R. E. MALLEN & J. M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, Chs. 18-19 (5th ed., West
Group 2000).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107; see also Bainbridge, supra note 93
(suggesting that the business judgment rule operates as an abstention doctrine
rather than as a standard of review).
347. See Fairness and Trust, supra note 296, at 434.
348. Id. at 435.
349. Id. at 433.
350. See supra Part I.B.
351. See id.
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change in the law certainly freed directors from concerns over legal
liability for negligent performance of their responsibilities.
There are undoubtedly a variety of reasons why directors who
should know better sometimes consciously disregard their fiduciary
obligations even when the duty to act is clear. First, as Congress
recognized in requiring members of the audit committees of publicly
held corporations to possess certain basic qualifications, a lack of
352
financial independence may cloud directors’ judgment. Similarly, a
lack of suitable expertise may discourage outside directors from
paying adequate attention to corporate finances. As Chancellor
Chandler noted in Disney IV, problems often arise in companies
presided over by “an imperial CEO or controlling shareholder with a
353
supine or passive board.” Overcommitment on the part of directors
354
An
who sit on multiple boards raises other kinds of issues.
aggressive “whatever it takes” management culture may intimidate
outside directors from inquiring about questionable management
355
practices even when they know they should do so, or the failure of
lawyers and other “gatekeepers” properly to advise directors as to
356
their responsibilities may lull directors into inaction.
Finally,
357
perhaps some directors, like the Widow Pritchard, just don’t care.
The growing realization that the boards of a number of major
corporations were unable to prevent serious misconduct on the part
of officers and employees led to the focus on the good faith
exception to section 102(b)(7) that first generated significant
358
attention following the Caremark decision.
Although the Delaware
courts continue to refine its parameters, the fiduciary duty to act in
good faith could become a significant tool in efforts to restore trust
in corporate directors to do their jobs. If the courts, however,
evidence reluctance to hold directors accountable for significant
352. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3).
(Supp. 2003).
353. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005).
354. See supra note 314.
355. See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1251-55 (suggesting that an aggressive
corporate culture can create pressure on individuals to engage in unethical
behavior).
356. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,
57 BUS. L. 1403 (2002).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 116-127.
358. See supra Part II.A.2.a. For discussion of the Enron and WorldCom situations,
see WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 148-77 (Feb.
1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport; DICK
THORNBURGH, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT
EXAMINER 6-7 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http:// fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf.
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derelictions of known duties, then the new good faith will become
little more than a rhetorical exhortation replete with good form but
359
As Chancellor Chandler observed in
utterly lacking in substance.
Disney II, “the law must be strong enough to intervene against the
360
abuse of trust.”
D. The New Good Faith as a Means of Promoting Trust
As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Francis, “[t]he
sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is
361
charged to protect.”
Unless directors are willing to act
conscientiously in overseeing the affairs of the corporations they
362
manage, no matter how talented or accomplished they may be, they
are not worthy of trust, and they should not be entitled to participate
in managing the business entities so vital to the economic well-being
of their constituents. Whether the new good faith will contribute
meaningfully to the task of restoring corporate trust depends to a
large extent on whether it motivates outside directors to engage
actively in their oversight function, and, just as importantly, whether
it offers a means of holding them accountable if they fail to do so.
Unless subsequent judicial decisions so dull its edge that, like the
proverbial knife incapable of cutting butter, it becomes functionally
useless, we believe that the Disney standard is capable of achieving
these objectives for four key reasons.
1.

The new good faith as an enforceable legal standard
Unless the defense bar succeeds in turning the Disney standard into
an examination of directors’ subjective motivations, the standard
offers the hope of closing at least part of the accountability gap
created by section 102(b)(7) by holding out the threat of personal
liability for conscious disregard of known duties. As discussed in Part
I.B, the business judgment rule cut deep inroads into the duty of care
as a standard of liability, and the exculpatory provisions authorized by
section 102(b)(7) gutted the duty, relegating it to the status of an
aspirational objective for directors of corporations with such
363
provisions in their certificates of incorporation. The advent of the
new duty of good faith, even as a distinct component of the duty of

359. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1.
360. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 291.
361. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (citation
omitted).
362. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part I.C and Part II.A.
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loyalty, does not alter the protections afforded to directors and their
decisions by the business judgment rule, nor does it undercut the
liability shield available to directors pursuant to section 102(b)(7),
for negligent, or even grossly negligent, decisions. It does, however,
provide a means of holding those who accept the prestige and
perquisites of corporate directorships accountable to act when their
duty to do so is clear. While shareholders theoretically have the
power to vote directors out of office, this authority is too seldom
exercised with respect to the boards of major corporations. By
providing a cause of action against directors who evidence a “we
364
don’t care about the risks attitude,” however, the new good faith
365
requires directors to exercise their power. At least where directors
have a known duty to act, the Disney standard promises to place much
needed limitations on the legal license not to care created by section
366
102(b)(7).
Thus, the new good faith is a modest step, but it is an
367
important one.
364. Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); see Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63.
365. See Sale, supra note 18, at 495 (“Strong enforcement of the duty of good faith
creates an incentive to prompt fiduciaries to better behavior, even if we cannot
change their character.”).
366. For various perspectives on the effectiveness of legal sanctions as a means of
promoting fiduciary fidelity, see, e.g., Blair and Stout, supra note 294, at 1750-53
(offering an anti-contractarian view of the advantages of “internalized trust” over
prescriptive legal rules as a means of generating trust and trustworthy behavior
within the firm); Ribstein, supra note 300, at 590 (“[M]andatory regulation may
actually decrease . . . trust by creating opportunities for distrust and inhibiting trustcreation.”). Discussion of contractarian and anti-contractarian views on the
desirability of legal sanctions in corporate fiduciary law is fascinating but beyond the
scope of this Article. However, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley testifies to a
widespread desire for legal sanctions capable of reining in business executives—both
officers and directors. Similarly, a number of scholars have called for more
comprehensive legal regulation of directorial conduct. Professor Fairfax, for
example, advocates this position in a recent article: “[A]lthough legal liability has
some costs, and hence its rod should not be used without an appreciation of those
costs and an attempt to minimize them, sparing directors that rod altogether may
encourage them to engage in lax behavior to the detriment of shareholders and the
public alike.” Spare the Rod, supra note 20, at 456. Cf., FRANKEL, supra note 10, at 119
(during the past three decades “[w]e have emasculated the regulation of trusted
persons—fiduciaries . . . [and] changed legal doctrine to reduce the burdens and
stigma on embezzling fiduciaries and converted them to salespersons and
contracting parties in the markets.”).
367. The new good faith may also serve an important role from a federalism
perspective. As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey notes, “[T]he Delaware
franchise is fragile largely because of encroaching federalization.” Corporate Universe,
supra note 2, at 163. In enacting Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress entered into the realm of
corporate governance law previously reserved to the states. See State-Federal Tension,
supra note 327. Chief Justice Veasey and others have argued that this intrusion
amounts to an unwise “federalization” of corporate fiduciary law. See id. See generally
sources cited supra note 327; cf. Johnson & Sides, supra note 329, at 1225 (suggesting
that while some provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley preempt state fiduciary law, these are
targeted sections that will neither preempt state fiduciary law generally nor preclude
state law from providing a “conceptual framework”). While it is certainly possible for
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The Disney standard as a means of incorporating emerging business
and social morés into corporate fiduciary law
Delaware’s former Chief Justice has observed that incorporating good
faith into fiduciary law permits the law to embrace “evolving
expectations”—the morés of the business community itself, as well as
368
broader societal demands. As Professor Eisenberg has explained:
2.

Circumstances change, the social norms applicable to the conduct
of business change, business practices change, concepts of
efficiency and other issues of policy applicable to corporate law
change. . . . In some cases, the articulation of such an obligation
can be justified by the duties of care or loyalty. In other cases, it
cannot. In those cases, the duty of good faith often provides a
369
principle that supports the articulation of the new obligation.

If the courts resist the temptation to eviscerate the flexibility
inherent in the new good faith standard, the doctrine promises to
fulfill a critical function in a changing legal environment, particularly
370
in the corporate area.
As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey
points out, the relevant standards are those that develop within the
business sector itself and within the broader community in which it
371
operates. The new good faith provides an important incentive for
directors to keep up with business and societal expectations and
reminds them that they cannot ignore their responsibility to act in
accordance with these standards without facing legal consequences.
While courts should be concerned about fairness in embracing any
liability standard that has flexible parameters, the very development
of the common law itself rests on the adaptability of judge-made
372
law. This is particularly true in Delaware corporate law where both
the legislature and the courts have embraced an “enabling
373
Moreover, if Delaware and other states do not hold
approach.”
directors accountable for flouting their duties while greedily
embracing the privileges and perquisites of office, the increasingly
fragile franchise that states hold over corporate governance matters
federal and state law to operate in a complementary fashion in this important area, if
the states are to maintain preeminence in general corporate law, lawmakers and
courts need to take measures to hold corporate decision-makers more accountable.
The new good faith is a step in this direction.
368. What Happened in Delaware, supra note 6, at 1439.
369. Good Faith in Corporate Law, supra note 6, at 30-31.
370. For discussion of the importance of Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence
see sources cited supra note 2.
371. See What Happened in Delaware, supra note 5, at 1436 (pointing out that
expectations of corporate directors are rooted in “business realities and morés”).
372. It is an oft-stated maxim that the genius of the common law arises from its
adaptability.
373. See supra note 154.
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may well be forced to give way to the increasing federalization of
374
Of course, the Delaware
corporate law so many have lamented.
General Assembly could readily resolve at least some of the dilemmas
facing the courts with respect to this issue, but it has not yet elected
375
to do so.
3. The language of the new good faith as a tool to help shape expectations of
directors and perceptions of their fiduciary obligations
While it is a mistake to expect empty rhetoric to effect change,
language does matter. As Professor O’Connor notes, the “the way we
talk about fiduciary obligation is crucial because the most
distinguishing characteristic of fiduciary law is its operation as a
system of moral education that promotes and reinforces trust and
376
Similarly, as Professor
honesty in commercial transactions.”
Johnson points out, “a moral vocabulary has been, and should
377
remain, central to corporate law discourse.” It is also true that legal
standards exert influence far beyond the courtroom because they
378
serve as the basis for the advice that counsel provide to their clients.
They can also create a kind of legal lore that influences actors in a
positive way, just as a lawless “tone at the top” creates the kind of
atmosphere that Congress sought to discourage in Sarbanes-Oxley.
379
The language of the new good faith—e.g., “honesty of purpose”
and “a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the
380
corporation and its shareholders” —implicitly recognizes that what
people say influences what they do. It calls directors to fidelity to the
interests they are charged to protect in sharp contrast with the
374. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
375. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del Ch. 2003) (noting
potential benefit of legislative action to correct “balkanization of duty of loyalty” by
revising section 102(b)(7)).
376. O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1318-19.
377. Loyalty Discourse, supra note 164, at 72; see also, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 965-66
(2002); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law Professors, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1490-98 (2002). Cf. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Dec. 2006) (suggesting that
the highly secular nature of corporate discourse may inhibit understanding of many
concepts, particularly the notion of faithfulness, and that allowing some of the
language of faith to enter into the vocabulary could offer significant benefits).
378. See Sale, supra note 18, at 494 (describing “real value” of duty of good faith as
arising from “the ex ante role it can play in changing the behavior and incentives of
corporate fiduciaries and thereby changing corporate governance”). As the United
States Supreme Court noted in Upjohn Co. v. United States, “corporations, unlike most
individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.’” 449 U.S. 383,
392 (quoting Bryson P. Birnbaum, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24
BUS. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).
379. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).
380. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. June 8, 2006).
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“cynical model of the corporate actor [that] has dominated the
thinking about the nature of the fiduciary duties owed by corporate
381
The latter is the view lauded by
actors over the last twenty years.”
Gordon Gecko in his rhapsody on the merits of greed in the movie
Wall Street; it is also the view decried by famed former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan in his denunciation of a corporate culture
382
“blighted by ‘infectious greed’” following the Enron debacle.
In addition to the threat of legal sanctions it holds out, the Disney
standard promises to encourage adherence to fiduciary duty by
383
reminding directors of the meaning of “true faithfulness.”
As
Professor Sale observes, when directors ignore problems they
“contribute to an atmosphere of permissiveness, recklessness, or
deliberate indifference that can result in bad governance and
384
business decisions, or worse, illegal activity.
To the extent that it
voices a countervailing call, the new good faith promises to have an
impact far beyond the boardroom.
4. The new good faith as an alternative to prescriptive measures that create
the risk of perverse incentives
“Trust comes in many different forms and contexts, and it can be
unpredictable and paradoxical in how it responds to different
385
influences.” Moreover, “[m]istaken assumptions about the role and
importance of external incentives in furthering cooperative behavior
can lead not only to mistaken descriptions but also to mistaken
386
prescriptions.”
The effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley and other
prescriptive approaches to the corporate trust crisis remains to be
seen, but the new good faith does not pose the risk of perverse
incentives. Instead, it calls on directors to do their jobs.
A strong, readily enforceable good faith obligation could well cause
individuals—even those with excellent credentials—to think twice
381. O’Connor, supra note 26, at 1317. Professor O’Connor suggests that this
model “presents a rather sterile view of fiduciary duty because it supports the idea
[of] ‘honesty is the best policy’ as an appeal to self-interest.” Id.
382. Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Corporate Conduct: The
Overview; Fed Chief Blames Corporate Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002,
at A1 (quoting July 16, 2002 Cong. Testimony of Alan Greenspan); see also Daniel
Altman, Parties Trade Lobs Over Issue of Lax Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C4
(quoting U.S. Rep. Bernard Sanders of Vermont regarding “incredible culture of
corporate greed”).
383. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. June 8, 2006). See Blair & Stout, supra note
294, at 1743 (one way law advances trust is “by framing the relationship between the
fiduciary and her beneficiary as one that calls for a psychological commitment to
trustworthy, other-regarding behavior”).
384. Sale, supra note 18, at 494-95.
385. Hall, supra note 296, at 525.
386. Blair & Stout, supra note 294, at 1808.
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about serving as corporate directors. Its demands, however, would be
unlikely to deter persons who are truly willing to do the job. As two
noted Delaware jurists recently emphasized, “[i]ndependent
directors who apply themselves to their duties in good faith have a
387
trivial risk of legal liability.”
If anything, the Delaware Supreme
Court’s recognition of the new good faith as a distinct fiduciary
obligation is likely to help inspire directors to stand up to
domineering CEOs, insist on receiving appropriate information, and
overcome a variety of structural obstacles to active engagement in the
business and affairs of their corporations. Consequently, the new
good faith is most likely to deter only those who do not belong on
corporate boards—those who are unable or unwilling to commit to
388
doing the job—from becoming directors. That is precisely what it
ought to do.
CONCLUSION
The new good faith has emerged at a critical time in the history of
American corporate governance. It is unclear whether corporate
directors can reclaim the high ground, but it is certain that they will
not succeed unless they actively engage in their oversight
responsibilities. In accord with this reality, while remaining faithful
to the spirit of the exculpatory provision of Delaware’s General
Corporation Law, the Disney standard holds out the promise that a
new, more comprehensive concept of good faith will become a
recognized principal fiduciary responsibility of corporate directors.
This new good faith focuses on “true faithfulness and devotion to the
389
interests of the corporation and its shareholders” as its measure,
and holds that conscious disregard of duty exposes directors to
personal liability.
387. Corporate Universe, supra note 2, at 170 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Director
Liability Warnings, BUS. & SEC. LITIGATOR (2003)); see also, e.g., E. Norman Veasey,
Annual Audit Committee Issues Conference Keynote Speech: “A Perspective on Liability Risks to
Directors in Light of Current Events”, 1486 PLI/CORP. 1227 (2005).
388. As Delaware’s Vice Chancellor Strine has observed, “If an overly busy person
serves on the boards of five public companies . . . [and] finds himself in a situation
where one of his companies is accused of serious wrongdoing that the board
arguably should have prevented, he should not be surprised if his good faith comes
under severe attack. . . .” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on
the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW 1371, 1373 (2002)
(quoted in Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee’s Ethical and Legal Responsibilities:
The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 38 (2005)). According to a posting on
the Shearman & Sterling LLP website, cited in Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and
the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129, 162 (2006), “[a]t least one director of fortyfive of the top 100 companies serves on five or more public company boards.” See
also supra note 314.
389. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755.).
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In exploring the parameters of the new good faith, we have argued
three principal points. First, we have suggested that the most
important legal innovation of the new good faith is its recognition of
the substantive difference between the traditional standard and
conscious disregard of a known duty to act. We have emphasized that
if the Disney standard is to function as a meaningful norm for holding
corporate directors accountable, it is critical to clarify that the new
good faith does not require the presence of subjectively improper
motivation.
Second, we have maintained that it is analytically cleaner to
articulate the Disney standard in terms of an absence of good faith
rather than the presence of bad faith. The Delaware Supreme Court,
however, has defined the hallmark of the new good faith—conscious
disregard of duty—as evidence of bad faith. Consequently, it is
incumbent on the courts to ensure that the criteria applied in this
context clearly define a new bad faith, one that clearly embraces
conscious disregard of known duties, regardless of intention, and
focuses on what directors have done or failed to do. Otherwise, there
is a real risk that references to “bad faith conduct” set forth in both
Disney V and the Disney IV decision it upholds, as well as in Stone, will
reduce the new fiduciary duty to little more than a minor, and
perhaps meaningless, variation on the classic duty of loyalty.
Finally, we have suggested that, if reasonably interpreted and
enforced, the Disney standard is capable of playing a significant role
in restoring corporate trust. While the scope of the new good faith
obligation is modest, its objectives are important. Unless outside
directors take their responsibility to engage actively in corporate
affairs very seriously, they have little if any chance of functioning
effectively to oversee the operations and finances of these highly
sophisticated, increasingly complex organizations. Society has a great
deal at stake in their success. Ensuring that those who direct the
business and affairs of corporations have effective incentives and the
structural support necessary to perform their function responsibly is a
critical task of corporate law.

